

104

U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA

Y 4. IN 8/16:B 65/2/996

U.S. Policy Toward Bosnia, 104-2 He...
HEARING

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS**

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 23, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



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U.S. POLICY TOWARD BOSNIA

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1996

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The hearing will come to order. Today's hearing is the first opportunity for our Committee on International Relations to assess the implementation of the Dayton Peace Plan since it was signed 5 months ago and to examine other aspects of our policy in Bosnia.

We all recognize that with the deployment of a peacekeeping force that includes over 20,000 American troops, the fighting has now been suspended. The major question now is whether the peace can be maintained while our forces are in Bosnia and after they leave. Lasting peace depends on the return of refugees, on democratization and on reconstruction.

Under the Dayton Plan all refugees who choose to do so are to be able to return to their homes. The plan calls for an international police force to ensure that local law enforcement officers carry out their functions according to international standards. So far, several hundred police officers, including about 50 Americans, are serving in that unit.

Though backed by NATO troops, they have failed their first major test, a task to prevent widespread arson and looting as Serbs left the suburbs of Sarajevo which were turned over to the Bosnian Federation last month. Troublemakers who were arrested were merely turned over to local Serb police, who set them free.

The Dayton Plan requires that Bosnia be able to hold free and fair elections for a new civilian government no later than September 14th, less than 4 months from now. Robert Frowick, the retired American diplomat who heads the office in Sarajevo established to oversee those elections, doubts that they can be held as scheduled.

The interNational community has been called upon to provide over \$5 million for the next 5 years to help Bosnia rebuild its devastated economy. President Clinton pledged that our Nation would provide some \$600 million over the next 3 years, but an underlying key question is whether with all good intentions our taxpayers dollars can be put to good use for reconstruction.

The Chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency has stated in writing that the Bosnian-Croat Federation will not survive the departure of our troops. There is the serious question of the Administra-

tion's promise to provide military equipment and training to this shaky Federation Army to enable it to defend itself against any outside enemy.

While the Congress sought to end the arms embargo against Bosnia, the Administration argued that the embargo had to be respected or the lives of peacekeepers would be in jeopardy. Now we have learned through press reports that early in 1994 while the President and his top foreign policy officials were telling the American public, telling our allies in Europe and the Congress that our Nation must abide by the embargo, the Administration secretly decided not to object to a covert Iranian operation of smuggling arms to Bosnia in violation of that very same embargo.

The Administration's decisions on this secret arms pipeline has led to a number of serious policy ramifications. First, a delegation of our committee staff returned from a trip to Bosnia just a few days ago to report sizable Iranian presence there typified by the new Islamic Cultural Center in downtown Sarajevo that is pictured here. This is the Iranian Cultural Center in the heart of downtown Sarajevo. Without question, the Iranians in Bosnia do pose a potential threat to our troops and to other interests.

Second, the Administration has stated that it will not implement its commitment to rearm and train the Bosnian military until the Iranians are out of Bosnia. The Bosnian Government, perhaps out of understandable gratitude, refuses to cut its ties to the Iranians. By turning a blind eye to the Iranian arms shipments, the Administration has allowed Iran to establish a sizable beachhead in the Balkans and to block our own program to assist the Bosnian military.

The Clinton administration's foreign policy seems to have evolved from one of nation-building in Somalia to strategic ambiguity in China and now to a new policy of "lights out in Bosnia" as described by the New York Times recent interview.

We welcome our witnesses to today's hearing to discuss these and other pertinent matters related to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Plan for Bosnia. We thank Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff; Assistant AID Administrator for Central Europe, and the New Independent States, Thomas Dine; and Thomas Longstreth, Director of the Bosnian Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for making themselves available to our committee this morning.

Before turning to Secretary Tarnoff for his testimony, I call on our ranking minority member, Mr. Hamilton, for any opening remarks that he may have.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

I have no opening remarks.

I want to express my appreciation to you for calling the hearing, as Bosnia developments are very hard to keep track of. I think it is appropriate that we have these hearings. And I also want to thank the Administration witnesses for their willingness to testify to us. I look forward to this hearing. I think it will be a productive one and useful for us.

I thank all the participants.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Because we have these witnesses available for only 2 hours, it is my understanding, I will ask other members to hold their opening remarks and to combine them with their questions or to submit those opening remarks for the record.

Before I swear the witnesses in, I would like to mention a special human rights case involving a young priest, Father Thomaslav Matanovich, an ethnic Croat.

Committee majority and minority staff met last week with the Roman Catholic Bishop of the Serbian-held city of Banja Luka. The bishop has become the unofficial representative of the few surviving non-Serbs left in that area. He is most concerned about Matanovich and his mother and father who have been held incommunicado since September 19th. We have been informed they are held in a jail on the grounds of the 5th Koraza Brigade under the command of Bosnian-Serb Colonel Pero Kolic.

I would like to request Secretary Tarnoff to look into this case and see if through contacts in Banja Luka or Belgrade we might win the release of Father Matanovich and his parents.

I now ask our witnesses to please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman GILMAN. Please be seated and let the record reflect that all of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Without objection your statements will be entered into the record in full.

I know the committee would appreciate it if Mr. Tarnoff would summarize his statement in 10 minutes or less and the other witnesses speak for 5 minutes or less so as to maximize the time available for questions and answers.

Mr. Tarnoff, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. TARNOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do have a somewhat longer statement for the record but I will try to confine my remarks to the 10 minutes.

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you with my colleagues, Tom Longstreth and Tom Dine from the Department of Defense and USAID for a discussion of the situation in Bosnia. Our efforts to bring peace to Bosnia through the implementation of the Dayton Accords remain well on track.

In the 5 months since the Peace Agreement we have witnessed a remarkable transformation. In a very real sense we are on the road from confrontation to conciliation. That journey is in its early stages, but I believe that we can be generally encouraged by the progress to date.

The significant impact that U.S. policy has had on the conflict is evident by remembering where we were 1 year ago. Then war raged, seemingly out of control. Today the killing has ended and peace is taking hold throughout Bosnia.

The Dayton Accords are not self-executing assurances of peace. To attain that end we and our allies are working in concert to encourage the parties to live up to their commitments.

The Dayton Accords set out a timetable for measures to be taken by the parties. With completion of the transfer of territory on March 19th, we reached the end of the first phase of the Dayton Accords and the start of the next, a return to normal life and preparation of proper conditions for elections.

After the OSCE certifies that Bosnia is ready for elections, the campaigning and extensive preparation for balloting will begin. Once elections are conducted, the institutions agreed at Dayton that are crucial to a viable Bosnian state will have to begin functioning.

Despite these accomplishments, compliance with certain commitments is not what it should be. During Dayton's first phase, implementation was largely driven by IFOR. As we approach elections the parties will shoulder a larger responsibility for success.

One of the most critical aspects of the effort to comply with Dayton involves a commitment by all parties to expel foreign military and advisory personnel. In this regard, we have insisted especially that Iranian military and intelligence personnel leave Bosnia.

In recent days, Mr. Chairman, there is, as you have mentioned, considerable attention being paid to reports that the United States did not actively oppose shipment of Iranian arms through Croatia to Bosnia 2 years ago. Let me review the circumstances and facts of that case.

From the outset the Clinton administration and most Members of Congress opposed the U.N. arms embargo against Bosnia. We wanted the arms embargo to be lifted multilaterally because if the United States had lifted the embargo unilaterally, U.N. sanctions regimes against Libya and Iraq would have been weakened and UNPROFOR would have departed Bosnia, leaving that country at greater short-term risk and requiring the United States to intervene to help extract UNPROFOR troops in difficult and dangerous circumstances.

In the spring of 1994, the government-held areas of Bosnia were under siege and the newly established Muslim-Croat Federation was in a precarious state.

In April 1994, we were asked by the Government of Croatia whether the United States would object if Croatia were to allow arms shipments to the Bosnian Government from other countries, including Iran, to transit Croatian territory. Given the military urgency of the situation facing the Federation on the ground and imbalance in favor of the Bosnian Serb forces, the Administration did not object to possible arms shipments to the Bosnians through Croatia. We decided that we would neither approve of nor object to such shipments.

U.S. representatives were told to respond to further inquiries by the Croatian Government by stating that they had no instructions on the issue. The United States, by the way, had no contact with the Government of Iran or other governments on that matter.

Beginning in May 1994, the U.S. intelligence community began to report flights by Iranian transport planes to Croatia with cargoes intended for Bosnia and which were believed to contain military as well as humanitarian supplies. These reports were contained in an intelligence document that is provided on a daily basis

to the relevant congressional committees. The leadership and its staff have always had access to these daily reports.

In October 1994, as an alternative to unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, the Congress, with strong bipartisan support, and Administration backing, enacted legislation making it illegal for the United States to use appropriated funds to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia. Congress was aware of Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia at the time.

Iranian shipments were not excluded from the applicability legislation, which took effect in November of that year. Our actions were consistent with the will of Congress as subsequently expressed in the October 1994 legislation that barred us from using appropriated funds to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia. At the same time, we did not cross the line of unilaterally abrogating a binding Security Council resolution by providing arms to the Bosnian Governments directly or indirectly.

The valiant armed forces of Bosnia did manage to hold out and to hold on to their territory. Because they did so, it was possible in 1995 for NATO to take action and for the United States to forge an agreement in Dayton which gives the people of Bosnia from all three communities the best chance they have had in years for peace.

On November 23, 1995, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1021, providing for lifting the embargo as a result of the Dayton Accords. Since then the Bosnian Government has been cooperating with us and is acting to comply with its obligation under Dayton to remove foreign forces.

The presence and influence of Iran in Bosnia is substantially reduced, and the Bosnian Government understands that the United States has conditioned implementation of our train-and-equip program on compliance with the foreign forces provisions of the Dayton Accords. This point was driven home to the Bosnians by both the Administration and the Congress.

The Dayton Accords included a key incentive for the parties to preserve peace. That was the promise of economic reconstruction. All sides have been exhausted by this bitter conflict.

While armies can be demobilized, it is a much more difficult task for governments to provide soldiers real jobs. Reconstruction aid is an essential investment for the future. Concrete benefits to the people of Bosnia from the Dayton Accords will help ensure that the Bosnian people acknowledge the improvement in their lives at the ballot box this summer.

The Muslim-Croat Federation is a cornerstone of the Dayton Accords. Given its importance for the success of the Dayton agreements, the United States has made the Federation focus of a broad-based program of political, technical and economic support.

In the past few months we have conducted a series of high-level meetings in Rome, Geneva, Moscow and Sarajevo devoted primarily to the solution of Federation issues, and I will lead the American delegation to the next such meeting this Thursday, April 25th, in Bonn.

The groundwork for a lasting peace depends not just on elections but also on creating an effective deterrent to renewed Bosnian-Serb aggression against the Federation. Therefore the Dayton Agree-

ment commits the parties to a series of confidence-building arms control measures.

Finally, it is impossible to envision a lasting peace that does not take account of the atrocities carried out over the past years. This is why the United Nations, at the urging of this Administration, established the International Tribunal at the Hague.

Since the Dayton Accords were signed, 57 individuals have been indicted, 6 taken into custody, and investigators have spent thousands of hours in Bosnia and its neighbors seeking evidence.

Compliance with the International Tribunal was made one of the touchstones in the Dayton Accords. Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade have each taken steps to improve its cooperation with the Tribunal since last year, but the lack of Bosnian-Serb cooperation with the Tribunal continues as the most glaring example of noncompliance with the accords.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, it must be remembered that it was American leadership that produced the relative but real improvements in progress that we can now observe in Bosnia. American leadership in cooperation with our friends and allies will see us through the challenges and opportunities that I have described.

When we and our NATO allies committed IFOR to Bosnia, we made it clear to the former warring parties that they were ultimately responsible for implementing the Peace Agreement. By limiting IFOR's deployment to 1 year, NATO signaled that it would not substitute itself for real progress by the parties toward achieving a lasting peace.

Given the remarkable advances that have been made in the course of the past year and the results of American leadership during that period, this Administration intends to persevere. As the President has said repeatedly, it is in the U.S. national interest to help bring peace to Bosnia. We will work with others to achieve that goal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Tarnoff.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tarnoff appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS DINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR EUROPE AND NEW INDEPENDENT STATES, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Thomas Dine, Assistant Administrator for Europe and the Newly Independent States, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Mr. DINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a written statement and I would be grateful if you would include it in the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. DINE. Let me say just a few words.

I was recently in Bosnia and nothing, not years of studying history and human behavior, not television footage, nor personal accounts prepared me for the extent and wantonness of the destruction I found there. The three sophisticated multiethnic cosmopolitan centers of city life, Mostar, Sarajevo, Yukovar are now endless

landscapes of destruction comparable to Beirut 10 years ago or post-World War II Berlin. In effect, the country imploded.

On April 12th of this year, 50 donor countries and international institutions pledged \$1.2 billion for Bosnia's reconstruction. The United States pledged \$219 million, given this Congress' prior approval of the supplemental, for which I thank all of you on this distinguished committee and the Congress. These moneys already are serving America's national interest.

As appropriate, the European Union pledged an additional \$417 million, demonstrating its commitment to rebuilding Bosnia. Clearly this is a down payment on the \$5 billion the World Bank is estimating Bosnia needs for its most basic needs over the next 3 years. My written testimony goes into considerable detail about USAID's programs in Bosnia.

Let me briefly outline the major elements. In effect, our assistance program has three major components: One, a reconstruction finance facility to provide quick disbursing loans to small and medium enterprises to stimulate employment.

Two, a municipal infrastructure program to finance small-scale resumption of vital infrastructure and services. This complements our emergency shelter program now underway to return 12,000 displaced and demobilized people to in-homes.

And three, a democracy program to augment international election planning and to contribute to restoration of a civil society. This includes voter education, rule of law and free and open media.

The reconstruction finance facility and the municipal infrastructure and services program have the added effect of contributing to a worldwide effort to redress Bosnia's crushing balance of payments problem. Both of these programs as well will require us to be on the ground with U.S. experts working directly with Bosnian counterparts and entrepreneurial participants. Be assured that no loans and no grants will be forthcoming in Bosnia without the concurrence of American bankers in the case of the reconstruction finance program, and without the concurrence of American contractors in the case of the municipal infrastructure services program.

No money will be disbursed without the full concurrence of USAID's mission director in Sarajevo. A concurrent audit will also be conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Inspector General's designee.

Right now Bosnia is operating at only 5 percent of its prewar industrial capacity and only 20 percent of Bosnians are employed. The problem is soon to be compounded by the demobilization of an additional 150,000 soldiers. This is in accord with the Dayton Agreement.

Without employment, without visible proof that reconstruction is underway, and without restoration of a civil society, it is not unthinkable that war will resume. As gratifying as the early signs of self-help may be to us all, the problems are simply too massive for Bosnians to address without abiding outside assistance.

Let me say in all candor to this committee that none of us can guarantee that reconstruction assistance will forestall a return to war. No zealous diplomat, no IFOR contingent, no reconstruction expert can guarantee this. But I can say without qualification that failure to promote reconstruction and failure to ameliorate the

sense of loss and despair will surely set the stage for this war's re-ignition. Of this last point I am absolutely certain.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dine.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dine appears in the appendix.]

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS LONGSTRETH, DIRECTOR OF THE
BOSNIA TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Chairman GILMAN. Our final panelist is Thomas Longstreth, Director of the Bosnia Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, have a prepared statement that I would like included in the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Last Thursday, April 18th, Mr. Chairman, marked the 120th day since Operation Joint Endeavor got under way in Bosnia. Today, just over 4 months after the IFOR's initial deployment, overall implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement is proceeding well.

In many ways implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement has gone far more smoothly than we hoped or could have expected. As NATO Secretary General Solana noted in his press conference yesterday, our judgment is that there continues to be reasonable adherence by the parties to the military annex of the Agreement.

There are no hostilities or preparations for the usual spring offensives. Forces are separated and the parties are generally compliant with the Zone of Separation. Of particular note, there have been no major confrontations between the parties since the Agreement entered into force December 14.

In fact, the cease-fire between the formerly warring factions has remained in place since October 12th. This is in itself, in my view, a significant accomplishment of both the Dayton Agreement and IFOR's deployment.

It is also worth noting that spring is now arriving in Bosnia, a time which for the past several years has meant the resumption of large-scale fighting in that country. But this year is different. This spring is being marked by formerly warring factions steadily moving heavy weapons and troops into designated cantonment areas and barracks.

IFOR has been able to break the normal cycle of violence and we believe such a development bodes well for the future of the country. The D+120 mark which came on April 18th also represents a major milestone with regard to the overall security environment in Bosnia.

At D+120, the parties pledged to move their forces and heavy weapons to cantonments and barracks and then demobilize those units that could not be accommodated within the facilities. In the view of Commander IFOR, Admiral Leighton Smith, and the Supreme Allied Commander, General George Joulwan, the parties are moving steadily to satisfy this D+120 requirement, although they

have been unable to comply fully with the deadline. I would be happy to go into that in more detail during the discussion.

In terms of challenges to IFOR, while there is little prospect of any direct organized conventional military attack against IFOR, IFOR's commanders remain vigilant in monitoring the overall security situation and seeking to reduce even the potential for confrontation. In addition, the potential threat from disgruntled elements or individuals remains, and is fully taken into account in IFOR's force protection plans.

Despite the fact that all of the key deadlines in the military annex have now come and gone, IFOR will continue to face implementation challenges. Ensuring completion of the cantonment process, providing for freedom of movement to allow for the return of refugees and displaced persons and supporting the War Crimes Tribunal are several of the key challenges which lie ahead.

As the critical deadlines of the military annex have been met, IFOR is now better able to undertake some of the supporting tasks included in its mandate and mission statement. These include providing assistance to international civilian organizations such as UNCHR and the International War Crimes Tribunal in the execution of their missions; ensuring freedom of movement for civilian populations and refugees; and monitoring the marking and clearing of mine fields throughout Bosnia.

But while assistance to civilian implementation will continue to be provided by IFOR on a case-by-case basis, it will be done in a manner that does not detract from IFOR's primary military mission, and IFOR must continue to focus on that mission and on providing a stable and secure environment in Bosnia which allows civilian implementation to go forward.

Nevertheless, successful military and civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement are closely linked and their implementation efforts must complement each other. IFOR is committed to maintaining a close and effective relationship with the High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, who is responsible for coordinating various aspects of civilian implementation. IFOR's office works closely with Mr. Bildt's staff.

IFOR is also continuing to assist the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as it undertakes its vitally important work. In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding worked out in January between the Commander IFOR, Admiral Smith, and Justice Richard Goldstone, the chief prosecutor for the Tribunal, IFOR supports the work of the Tribunal in several ways:

First, by exchanging information on Tribunal indictments, arrest warrants and the identification of indicted war criminals.

Second, by transferring indicted war criminals to Tribunal custody if IFOR troops, in the normal course of their duties, come into contact with those indicted war criminals.

And finally, through providing area security, communications and logistics support to Tribunal investigators in a manner that does not detract from IFOR's military mission.

Finally, there has been some speculation in the press of late concerning the possible extension of IFOR's mission in Bosnia beyond 1 year. In accordance with previously stated policy, let me reiterate

that the Department of Defense has no plans to extend IFOR's mission beyond 1 year.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1031 provides the mandate for a 1-year IFOR mission and NATO's North Atlantic Council has authorized IFOR to carry out its mission for that same period. We continue to believe that a 1-year IFOR deployment provides sufficient time for the formerly warring factions to choose peace and begin in earnest the processes of national reconstruction, new institution-building and reconciliation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Longstreth.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Longstreth appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. To follow up on your last statement, that you can reassure this committee that all U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Bosnia by December 20, 1996, which is the 1-year anniversary of the deployment and implementation of force into Bosnia?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Mr. Chairman, that is my guidance from the Secretary of Defense. My understanding is that in his conversations with SACEUR, SACEUR has asked for a little bit of flexibility in terms of whether or not every individual will be out on December 14th. But the plan is to begin to withdraw with sufficient time to have our mandate end at that 1-year period. So I can assure the committee that that is the guidance I have from the Secretary of Defense and that is my understanding of our policy.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Tarnoff, is that your understanding as well?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, it is Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. I understand the Administration has asked the Department of Defense to amend its original plan and begin the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Bosnia this July. The Pentagon has now been told that no U.S. forces should be withdrawn until after the Bosnian elections currently scheduled for September 15th.

Are we to conclude from this that the original target date for withdrawing all U.S. forces from Bosnia may slip by at least 2 months?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Mr. Chairman, I know of no previous plan to begin the withdrawal in July. In my conversations with Admiral Smith, and I believe in Admiral Smith's conversations with the Secretary, he has said that during the course of the summer he plans to trade out units and perhaps trade in other units as the mission evolves in order to ensure that he has the proper mix of forces on the ground.

As I recall our most recent discussions in Sarajevo, he stated, for example, that he might trade out some heavier armor units and bring in some lighter units because of the nature of the mission as it is evolving. But my understanding in terms of the redeployment of IFOR is that it will be similar to the deployment of IFOR which took on the order of 2 to 3 months, and would presumably take about that time to be completed in terms of redeployment. So I know of no plans to begin that withdrawal in July.

Chairman GILMAN. When are the initial withdrawals supposed to take place?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Mr. Chairman, I honestly do not know. I know that the planning is only now getting under way at SHAPE and in the theater. If there has been a date established for the beginning of the withdrawal, I am not aware of it.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Tarnoff, is there any request to delay the withdrawal until after the elections, as far as you know?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, our policy, as Mr. Longstreth has reiterated, is to have all U.S. forces out on or about the 14th of December. We did feel that it was important to have IFOR at full complement through the summer, including during the election period, but the only way that that will happen is to make it consistent with our commitment to have the forces out by the end of the year.

Chairman GILMAN. So there is still no plan, then, to delay the withdrawal?

Mr. TARNOFF. There is none whatsoever, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Perry testified November 30th that an important and significant factor in the cause of this war was the dramatic imbalance of forces which existed 4 years ago between the Bosnian Government forces and the Bosnian Serbs, and therefore when we leave at the end of the war we do not want to leave the same imbalance.

In light of that testimony, please tell us whether the equip-and-train program with the Bosnian Federation is moving forward as quickly as we had intended, and if not, is it possible that continued delays in implementing the equip-and-train program may prolong the current military imbalance on the ground in Bosnia, thereby making it difficult for our forces to withdraw from Bosnia by December 20, 1996?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a brief word about this and turn to Mr. Longstreth. Basically we think the equip-and-train program is off to a good start. We have as a result of diplomatic activity been able to collect approximately \$100 million from countries in the Islamic world who vigorously support this program.

There is also intention on the part of the Administration to provide drawdown funds for equipment for the equip-and-train program. It is also clear, and I should make the point here that the equip-and-train program will not go into effect unless and until all foreign forces are certified by IFOR to have departed Bosnia, and that is a condition for this program to go forward. But the start is a promising one.

I might ask Mr. Longstreth to provide some more details about it.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Mr. Chairman, I would agree that the program certainly got off to a slow start, but I think we have made significant progress in the past several weeks.

Chairman GILMAN. Are we now equipping and training Bosnian forces?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Not yet, sir. Let me go over some of the recent developments.

Most recently we had a mission, as you may have heard about, to the Middle East which was successful in raising a significant amount of money for the program. We had earlier estimated the

cost of the equip-and-train program on the order of \$600 to \$700 million. We raised a significant portion of that.

Chairman GILMAN. How much of those funds have been raised?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Between \$100 and \$200 million. The exact figure I am not quite sure of. But it was a significant amount of money that will allow this program to get started.

The key hurdle we have to get over at this point is the establishment of a Federation defense law that would provide an entity that we can pass the training and the equipment through. But the United States is planning to provide on the order of \$100 million worth of equipment in drawdown. That equipment is preparing to go as soon as the defense law is ready and as soon as the Bosnians fulfill the other requirements that Under Secretary Tarnoff mentioned. Then I think the training could begin in short order.

As you know, the Bosnians are looking at a number of different American companies that would have the contract to begin that training, and as soon as these contracts are signed and these other requirements are met that training could get underway.

Recall, too, Mr. Chairman, that the Dayton Agreement limits the amount of equipment that can be provided in both the first 3 months of implementation and the first 6 months. Since we are beyond the D+90 deadline, limited amounts of equipment can be provided, but all heavy weapons have to wait for the 6-month deadline, and we are not there yet.

Chairman GILMAN. Where would the equipment come from?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. The United States right now is the only country that has signed up to providing equipment from its own inventories. That equipment would come from a variety of depots and storage areas throughout the United States. Other countries have been approached I believe, including Turkey and other countries, and have suggested a willingness to provide equipment, but my understanding is that it is still under discussion in terms of precisely what equipment they could provide.

Chairman GILMAN. So essentially we have not yet implemented the equip-and-train—none of the equipment has come to Bosnia; is that correct?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. That is correct.

Chairman GILMAN. One of the conditions is that the Bosnians must assure us that all of the Iranians are out of Bosnia?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. That is correct.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Tarnoff, has that been accomplished? Are there Iranians now still in Bosnia?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are Iranians in Bosnia. Let me clarify that all Iranians involved in any way in intelligence or military support or advisory functions must be out of Bosnia and there remain a small number of Iranians in Bosnia who we believe are still involved in those functions.

The Bosnian Government has made substantial progress over the past 3 months in reducing the number of Iranians involved in those functions, and the Bosnian Government understands, as I mentioned before, that unless all Iranians involved in those functions are out of Bosnia, the equip-and-train program will not go forward.

Chairman GILMAN. How many Iranians are still in Bosnia in both advisory capacity and any other capacity?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer for reasons I hope you would accept, to provide that information on a classified basis.

Chairman GILMAN. But there are still a significant number there, are there not, in advisory capacities?

Mr. TARNOFF. The numbers of Iranians involved in intelligence and military and security activities is significantly lower than it was before. I would like to, if I might, reserve the actual figures for a classified setting.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Tarnoff, if the Iranian departure is delayed, will that not still prolong the current military imbalance on the ground in Bosnia, thereby making it difficult for our forces to withdraw by the December deadline?

Mr. TARNOFF. I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, that a delay in the departure of Iranians involved in these activities would have any impact on the departure of IFOR. What it would delay is the start of the equip-and-train program, which is vital to their own defense. And that is one of the reasons that the Bosnian Government is taking seriously the conditions we have imposed for that program to begin, namely that all such Iranians depart.

Mr. ROTH. Would the Chairman yield?

Mr. Chairman, I think that you are on a very crucial line of questioning. I have a question. I have talked with some Europeans, for example, some Germans and others, and they have said that if we leave in December, they are going to leave, too. Have we taken that into our calculations and what is our response to that, that if we leave, others will leave, too?

Mr. TARNOFF. If I might, my colleague from DOD, Mr. Longstreth, and I might both respond.

The answer is yes, we have taken that into consideration because the IFOR mandate that Mr. Longstreth referred to earlier is of course NATO-wide. This means that as IFOR ends, our NATO partners have made clear to us that they would withdraw their forces at approximately the same time we have because they would not want to remain behind after departure of U.S. forces.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, one more question.

I listened intently to Mr. Dine's testimony and was struck by the fact that he seemed to be saying that this is an area that is fraught with danger. We are going to leave in December, and all NATO forces leave no matter what happens; is that what you are telling us?

Mr. TARNOFF. The NATO-IFOR mission will end in December, that is correct, Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Tarnoff, can you confirm or deny the reports in the April 5th, Los Angeles Times statement that the Clinton administration consciously decided to give the green light to Croatia to establish an arms pipeline from Iran to Bosnia?

Mr. TARNOFF. I would not agree with the characterization of what the Clinton administration did at that time.

Chairman GILMAN. How would you define that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again to reiterate one or two of the things I said before, I would make the point that we were faced with a choice 2 years ago. I think it is important to remember the context of the question that was posed to us at that time.

First of all, the Administration with strong support from the Congress had taken since assuming office, strong exception to the arms embargo. We were working very vigorously to have the arms embargo lifted because we were very concerned about the disparity of forces and the imbalance that was hurting the cause of the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Muslims.

Second, at that point, especially in Eastern Bosnia, the Government of Bosnia forces were under intense pressure. They were outgunned, they were outmanned, they were ceding territory and we were very concerned at that moment that a military debacle might well have ensued. Therefore when the question was posed to us, as I indicated in my prepared statement, we had three choices. One was to try actively to oppose the shipment of arms to the Bosnians by several governments, including Iran. If we had done so, it would have weakened further the military cause of the Bosnian Government already under siege, as I mentioned before.

The second alternative we had was unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. As I indicated in my prepared statement, this would have led to the removal of UNPROFOR, the introduction of U.S. forces in difficult and dangerous circumstances. That is why the hard decision was made, but we believe the correct one at the time, to issue the instruction to our ambassador that he should not have an official position with respect to the shipment of arms through Croatia to Bosnia.

Chairman GILMAN. The April 5th, Los Angeles Times report states that this issue was decided personally by President Clinton; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I was not in the presence of the President at that time and therefore I am not able to comment on that specific description.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you know when and where that decision was made?

Mr. TARNOFF. I know, Mr. Chairman, that it was discussed at the highest levels of the department which I represent. Secretary Christopher was in the Middle East. I was in touch with him at that moment. I was also in touch with Deputy Secretary Talbott. All I can testify to are the conversations that I had at the time the decision was made.

Chairman GILMAN. Who informed you of the decision, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. TARNOFF. I was informed by the National Security Council that a decision was made to issue the instruction to Ambassador Galbraith.

Chairman GILMAN. Who in the Security Council?

Mr. TARNOFF. I don't recall specifically how I got that communication.

Chairman GILMAN. Approximately when were you informed of that decision?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, I would have to check the records of conversations at the time, but it was within a day or so after the telegram was received from Ambassador Galbraith requesting instructions with respect to the question that he had been asked by President Tudjman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, back in September 1992, the Bush administration demanded that Croatia seize an Iranian aircraft that had landed in Croatia loaded with arms. The Croatians complied with that request.

Accordingly, the decision made by the Clinton administration to give a green light to Iranian arms shipments or at least not to object to them was a fairly major change in U.S. policy, was it not?

Mr. TARNOFF. In all frankness, I am not familiar with the incident that you refer to. It obviously relates to facts and circumstances before the Clinton administration came into office. But again, our rationale for making this decision, which was a difficult one—there were various factors on all sides of the issue that we had to weigh very carefully—was made for the reasons that I presented to you.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, when you participated in the evolution of this new policy, were you aware that this was a major change in policy?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, we weighed all of the factors very carefully at the time we were asked to respond to a question from President Tudjman. We were also acutely aware of the fact that the Bosnian Government forces were under enormous military pressure at that time, and part of the reason that the decision was made, which I have described to you, relates to these circumstances, the very dire and special circumstances at that time.

Chairman GILMAN. I assume from your response that you are not aware that this was a major change in policy; isn't that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. I was not aware, Mr. Chairman, of the incident that you referred to on September—

Chairman GILMAN. Apparently it was the prior policy.

Were you aware that this was a major change in our policy with regard to arms shipments to the Bosnians?

Mr. TARNOFF. I would characterize the decision a different way, Mr. Chairman. I would characterize it as responding to the circumstances at the time under which the Bosnian Government was confronted with a situation which put its very survival at risk.

Chairman GILMAN. That response, though, was a major change from what we permitted in the past, isn't that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. There had been a different signal made in September 1992, but I am not aware of what the conditions and circumstances were with respect to the military situation of the Bosnian Government at that time.

Chairman GILMAN. The recent New York Times report said that when they were being interviewed over in Bosnia, our people, they said they asked for whether there was a green light or a red light with regard to this policy, and we are informed that there was not going to be any light. So it was a lights-out policy. We had gone from an engagement policy to an ambiguity policy for foreign policy, and now it was a lights-out policy.

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, I would characterize our response somewhat differently, Mr. Chairman. It sometimes happens that ambassadors, diplomatic representatives abroad do not receive instructions. I realize in this case this was a significant decision that we had to make. It was reviewed at the highest levels of the State Department and of the Administration, and for the reasons I gave and

because of the circumstances at the time, this was the decision that was made and conveyed to Ambassador Galbraith.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, I sent a letter dated April 11th to Secretary Christopher to ask some questions about the delivery of arms from third countries, and I would appreciate it if I could have a response to that letter soon.

Mr. TARNOFF. If I may, you will have a response today, Mr. Hamilton. There are still some items which require further evaluation, but you will have that response today.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think all of us want to try to understand these events better. My general impression is that you were trying to strike a balance between a policy of abiding by the arms embargo and containing the spread of Iranian influence on the one hand and our concerns at the same time about the military situation facing the Federation forces. That dilemma is what you were wrestling with and what you have described here.

Mr. TARNOFF. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is also my understanding that the intelligence information concerning the arms shipment by Iran was known by many Members of Congress, including myself, I might say, throughout this period. Is that correct or not?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, that is correct, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, I want to pick up on some of the questions asked by the Chairman and by Mr. Roth. On this question of withdrawal, I think you indicated we would not remain there past December 20th, as I recall. I got the impression in your answer that not much is being considered after that.

I have heard from people who have worked very closely in Bosnia that 1 year is going to be inadequate to the task, and Mr. Dine set out for us some of the challenges that are still before us.

Is there no consideration being given now to a follow-on force at all? Is it the intent now just to pull out on December 20th, and have no military force there of any kind?

Mr. TARNOFF. Let me begin a response and turn to Mr. Longstreth for amplification.

The President's decision was very clear, as was NATO's decision that the IFOR-NATO force would be withdrawn the year after it was inserted; in other words, at the end of December. The reason for this is that when we look at the mission of this force which Mr. Longstreth described in somewhat greater detail beforehand, IFOR will have accomplished its mission. Everything that IFOR has undertaken to do is either completed or well on the way to completion.

Mr. HAMILTON. I appreciate that, and I understand that is a very limited, defined mission. I don't have any doubt about the President's commitment. I am just thinking beyond that. Are you saying to us that no force of any kind is going to be necessary after December 20th?

Mr. TARNOFF. What I'm saying is that there are other possible arrangements that are already completed. The International Police Task Force, 2,500 international police officers of whom about 200

will eventually be Americans is one of the ways that police functions will be ensured in the Federation area as well as in the Bosnian Serb part of the country as well. We are mindful of continuing security needs and the IPTF basically working with the Federation and—

Mr. HAMILTON. You are not thinking now of any military force there?

Mr. TARNOFF. We are not contemplating any organized military—

Mr. HAMILTON. There is no consideration being given to any kind of follow-on military force after December 20th?

Mr. TARNOFF. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. And your thoughts are that whatever security needs are present after December 20th can be met by the police force?

Mr. TARNOFF. They will be enhanced by the police force, but the related activity, of course, is our commitment to the program of both reduction of military equipment and personnel throughout Bosnia, as well as the equip-and-train program that was described to you beforehand.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, if I may follow up, I completely agree with Tom Dine's evaluation of the civilian reconstruction situation. But before we deployed we were well aware that the civilian reconstruction of Bosnia was going to take many years. IFOR's focus and our focus in the Department is on the here and now. We are only 120 days into this deployment. We still have 8 months to go, and our focus is on accomplishing as much as we can within that 8 months to facilitate the peace in Bosnia.

In fact, the deployment, as I mentioned in my opening statement, has gone far better than we expected. And here we are, 120 days along with virtually all of the key military tasks accomplished. Now IFOR can assist and facilitate civilian reconstruction, the building of institutions over the next 8 months, and that, in my view, is the proper focus of IFOR and that is what I and we, in the Department of Defense and in the Department of State and AID, are focused on.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many troops are there in IFOR?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I believe the total today, Congressman Hamilton, is about 53,000.

Mr. HAMILTON. And how many police would there be when the IFOR pulls out?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I have no idea, Congressman, there are 1,000 now out of a total of—

Mr. HAMILTON. So you are replacing a security force of about 55,000 with a police force whose function under the Dayton Accords is largely one of monitoring and now stands at about 1,000. You expect the security of the region to be satisfactorily handled by that police force after the 55,000 IFOR troops have left?

Mr. TARNOFF. Congressman, let me respond to the broader point.

Mr. HAMILTON. You can respond to the specific point if you want to.

Mr. TARNOFF. I'll do that as well. Obviously, a couple of thousand police officers will not replace a NATO-led IFOR component of 53,000 to 55,000 men and women. But we are convinced that after

the separation has been achieved, which is the case after the containment and removal of heavy weapons has been achieved, after IFOR has done substantial work to create an atmosphere of security in and around the country relating to the other ancillary activities that Mr. Longstreth has talked about, it is now up to the parties to demonstrate that they are able to work on the kinds of things that Tom Dine and the rest of us have been talking about here.

And in that case, we feel that the prospect of the removal of IFOR by the end of the year acts rather as an incentive to the parties to take seriously their responsibilities, with help from the international community under certain conditions, as opposed to an open-ended commitment by the United States or NATO to provide this kind of massive military presence for a long period of time.

Mr. HAMILTON. I hope very much that you are right, Mr. Secretary. I do believe you have an extremely optimistic view of what can be accomplished in the remaining months there. It may be that that can be accomplished. I hope you're right, but I am doubtful. I wish you well on it.

I must say it seems to me that prudence would dictate that some kind of follow-on force be under consideration. And I'm not specifically saying U.S. troops should participate. But given the history, given the problems that exist in the area which Mr. Dine has described and you have described, it appears to me that you are counting on an awful lot happening in the next few months.

Now, let me ask about this Muslim Croatian Federation. I think in many respects it appears, to some of us at least, that the leaders are losing interest in a multiethnic Bosnia and moving toward, in reality, a kind of a three-way split of Bosnia. Give me your current assessment of this Federation and how well it is working and what you anticipate will happen here.

Mr. TARNOFF. Our assessment, Congressman Hamilton, is that the Federation is beginning to take hold and develop. It has been slow in coming. You're absolutely right. The Croat and Muslim communities in Bosnia had a history of antagonism, including violent confrontation.

But since the Dayton Accords, we have been encouraged by the fact that there are increasing ties between the two communities. We have, as was indicated earlier, sponsored a whole series of Federation events of bringing together members of the Muslim and Croat communities. We have a team now, for example, in Sarajevo working with the leadership of both of those communities in order to put a new defense law on the books.

There are a whole range of commissions that are operating. And because so much of the incentives are directed toward the Federation, equip-and-train, military reconstruction, we believe that the leaders of both communities understand increasingly that the Federation is the entity which requires their support.

Mr. HAMILTON. So your judgment is the Federation is going to work as the Dayton Accords suggest?

Mr. TARNOFF. We believe that once the elections occur this summer, and there are legally established political institutions, the Federation will be on its way. There will be tough times ahead, ob-

viously, for the country and for the Federation, but that the groundwork is strengthening and is in good—

Mr. HAMILTON. Are you confident you can avoid the problem of mission creep of IFOR? There has been a lot of pressure, I know, put on IFOR to do things to provide security for the OSCE, for the police task force, for other institutions there. I understand you are now involved in some infrastructure repair in the area. There has been talk about participation in the removal of land mines and all of the rest.

What do you have to say to us about mission creep? If you read the Dayton Accords, as you mentioned a moment ago, Mr. Longstreth, they are very narrowly defined as to what IFOR is supposed to do.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, I am confident that we can avoid mission creep. We get criticized on both sides as you can imagine. On the one hand, IFOR gets criticized for having 54,000 troops in-country that are not doing enough to facilitate reconstruction. On the other hand, we get criticized for the potential mission creep.

I think COMIFOR has it just about right. He is focused on his key military tasks. He is focused on force protection, on ensuring IFOR freedom of movement, and ensuring that key aspects of the agreement are implemented.

Mr. HAMILTON. You are also building some infrastructure, are you not?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Yes, sir. It has always been part of IFOR's mission statement, and he has the authority to support other civilian efforts so long as it is done within his capabilities, so long as—

Mr. HAMILTON. So building infrastructure is not mission creep.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Excuse me, Congressman, if I could just finish—

Mr. HAMILTON. Building infrastructure is not mission creep?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. No, sir, I believe that the infrastructure improvements, by and large, that IFOR has taken on have been primarily devoted to ensuring its own freedom of movement and facilitating its own deployment. For example, we have done some bridge repair and road repair around the country. We have helped build some permanent bridges across the Sava River. We have now done some air runway repair—

Mr. HAMILTON. Providing security for various groups is not mission creep?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Well, within the Dayton agreement, Congressman, and within the IFOR mission statement it states, as I pointed out in my testimony, it states that these are supporting tasks that IFOR has the authority to undertake, so long as they do not—

Mr. HAMILTON. Can they help with refugees and displaced persons?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Excuse me, if I could finish the sentence. Excuse me.

Mr. HAMILTON. Can IFOR get directly involved in helping refugees and displaced persons?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. IFOR has the authority and the mandate to facilitate the freedom of movement of displaced persons and refugees.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is going to be hard to accuse you of mission creep because you interpret the mission so widely you can do just about anything you want to.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I don't believe it is my interpretation.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you are the one giving us the interpretation this morning.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, I am just telling you my understanding of what the agreement says.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that, but you are interpreting that agreement very broadly.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I am simply stating to you, Congressman, what my understanding is of COMIFOR's interpretation of his mandate—

Mr. HAMILTON. You are telling me, Mr. Longstreth, that you can provide security to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, provide security to the international police, provide security to the OSCE, and build infrastructure, all under the Dayton Agreement?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Sir, if you would like, I could go through each one of those issues individually, because my characterization of what IFOR is doing in each of those areas is slightly different than your own. For example, IFOR does not provide security for displaced persons. What it does is facilitate freedom of movement of those persons in support for the—

Mr. HAMILTON. If you are facilitating the movement, doesn't that mean you protect them?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Let me give you an example—

Mr. HAMILTON. If you are facilitating the movement, doesn't that mean you are protecting them?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. When those individuals are moving, you are providing area security just as you are for the country of Bosnia.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is exactly what I said to you a moment ago.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, my point is that IFOR is not on a 24-hour-a-day basis providing security for all—

Mr. HAMILTON. I didn't say that it was.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Then we agree.

Mr. HAMILTON. I'm impressed by how widely you interpret the Dayton Accords, Mr. Longstreth. I have never heard any interpretation approaching what you have given us this morning in terms of the breadth of the agreement. I am really quite surprised by it.

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, all I can tell you is that I am simply telling you what my understanding is of IFOR's mandate and responsibilities as they have been explained to me by the commander of IFOR and by General Joulwan and others.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. As you may agree, the Administration has escaped any substantial formal oversight on Bosnia to this point. Today is a very important day because we are beginning that process here in the House. Of course, you understand it is our constitutional responsibility to pursue oversight of the foreign policy of the United States and this is, of course, one of the most controversial and complex areas.

We would appreciate direct responses, short responses, no filibustering, and a cooperative mood to give us an opportunity to conduct our institutional role.

I say that without criticism. I'm just trying to lay the groundwork for questions that I'm going to be asking you, Secretary Tarnoff. I'd like to read to you all from today's Los Angeles Times related to a decision. This is what it says:

Clinton's decision to allow Iranian arms shipments came from the President of Croatia. Asked if the United States would object to Iranian arms shipment moving through Croatian territory to neighboring Bosnia, the question moved quickly up the U.S. chain of command to Clinton's National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

At the time Secretary of State Warren Christopher was traveling in the Middle East. Lake and Talbott recommended that the U.S. Ambassador in Croatia tell the Croatian President that he had, "no instructions," about arms shipments, diplomatic language meaning the United States would not object. Clinton quickly agreed.

One official said there was some discussion at lower levels about helping Iran expand its influence in Bosnia. Were long papers written on this? No, he said. Was the issue discussed? Yes, it was at least at the State Department the official added. We chose the course we did in full recognition that this would give Iran an enhanced standing in Bosnia.

Then goes on later, the way the decision was made eliminated the opportunity for debate throughout the Administration's national security apparatus, according to the conclusions of the writer of the article. Defense Secretary William J. Perry and John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were informed only after Clinton made his decision, officials said. Christopher was informed right before Lake went to the President.

Now, if in fact that is the case, a response from Secretary Christopher to reporters later about the Iranian arms shipment, the Secretary of State replied in what would appear to be disingenuous fashion. I suppose it is only inevitable, not desirable but inevitable, that there will be some leakage. Still, he added, the United States expects some compliance with the embargo.

In fact, Secretary Christopher had been told about this and whether or not we had given a green light, he would have been knowledgeable about the Iranian arms shipment.

Now, the first point is not whether or not the Members of Congress had heard rumors or been told about shipments of arms from Islamic sources. In checking with members of the Intelligence Committee in the previous Administration during a period in time in which we are discussing, checking with the leadership on our side of the aisle during that period of time, the Congress was never informed about a U.S. role in permitting arms from Iran to go to Bosnia.

Secretary Tarnoff, I would appreciate your answers to these questions. If you do not have direct knowledge, I would appreciate you giving me your understanding of what happened if you are able to do that.

First, how did President Clinton make the decision to allow Iranian arms into Bosnia? Was it, in fact, presented to him by advisors in a meeting on Air Force I, as has been reported in the press?

Mr. TARNOFF. I have no knowledge of that, Mr. Chairman, and I would rather not speculate because I was not present with the President when this matter was discussed.

Mr. BEREUTER. If President Clinton made the decisions in the presence of the advisors, which advisers were present when he made the decision? I assume you have no knowledge of that.

Mr. TARNOFF. I have no knowledge of that either.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you have an understanding developed by secondary sources?

Mr. TARNOFF. No, I do not.

Mr. BEREUTER. What was the position of the State Department on this issue? That is to say whether or not the Croatians would be allowed to have Iranian arms transshipped through Croatia to Bosnia?

Mr. TARNOFF. On that matter, after consulting with Secretary Christopher, I was able to say that the Department's position was to support the idea that an instruction should go out to Ambassador Galbraith along the lines of what we have described.

Mr. BEREUTER. How was the decision reached within the State Department? To what extent were papers prepared, options discussed, ramifications considered?

Mr. TARNOFF. I can only discuss the conversation that I had with Secretary Christopher, who was in the Middle East at the time, who had seen the incoming message from Ambassador Galbraith, and we discussed the issue and he gave me his point of view, which I have described to you. All of this was done very rapidly in the course of a day or so.

Mr. BEREUTER. What was the recommendation going forward to Secretary Christopher regarding the possible "no instructions" message being delivered to the Croatians through Ambassador Galbraith or other ways?

Mr. TARNOFF. There was not a recommendation. We discussed the issue and the various options and Secretary Christopher came to the conclusion that this was, in his view, the preferred way to go.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you know if Secretary Christopher made that recommendation to the President personally or if it was made by Secretary Talbott?

Mr. TARNOFF. I cannot answer that. I was not part of those conversations.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, whether President Clinton consulted anyone else within the Administration outside the State Department and outside the National Security Advisor? For example, do you know if, in fact, he consulted the Defense Department?

Mr. TARNOFF. I have no knowledge of what the process may have been.

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Longstreth, do you understand whether or not the Secretary of Defense knew about the decision to give the green light to the Iranians to transship arms through Bosnia?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I have no knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Has there been any public reaction from the Defense Department concerning their involvement in this decision?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Any public reaction? I believe Mr. Chairman, I believe Ken Bacon, the press spokesman, has issued either talking points or a statement. I'll have to check that. And if so, I would be happy to provide that for the record.

Mr. BEREUTER. I think I understand the answer I'll get on this, but I want to ask them for the record, Secretary Tarnoff. The L.A. Times story said that Strobe Talbott and Tony Lake were involved

in the decision—I'm talking about the decision to give the go ahead, the green light, the "no instructions" to the Croatians regarding the transshipment of Iranian arms through Croatia.

Do you know if Strobe Talbott or Tony Lake were involved in that decision?

Mr. TARNOFF. I have no direct knowledge of that.

Mr. BEREUTER. What was Strobe Talbott's recommendation to the President on that matter? You do not know that; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. That's correct.

Mr. BEREUTER. Finally, was there any written decision memorandum prepared for the President in the State Department laying out the pros and cons of setting up an Iranian arms pipeline?

Mr. TARNOFF. There was no State Department document to that effect.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HYDE. I was interested, Mr. Tarnoff, in your answer, "I had no direct knowledge." What indirect knowledge, if any, did you have?

Mr. TARNOFF. I have no indirect knowledge either. It's not a matter that I knew about at the time or have acquired knowledge of subsequently.

Mr. HYDE. It is certainly something that would concern you, how a radical departure from previous policy and previously announced policy was formulated. Doesn't that professionally concern you as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs?

Mr. TARNOFF. I believe, Mr. Hyde, that the policy was discussed at the highest levels of the Administration. I had conversations with Secretary Christopher, the head of our department, on the situation that confronted us given the questions that were posed to Ambassador Galbraith. So as far as the State Department was concerned, we felt that we were given every opportunity to have access to the information and to have a point of view expressed.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Calling members in the order in which they appeared on alternative sides of the aisle, the Chair would recognize Mr. Frazer, the delegate from the Virgin Islands, for his time.

Mr. FRAZER. I'd like to ask Mr. Longstreth, Mr. Bereuter kind of laid the ground rules so try to be as forthright as possible.

Mr. Tarnoff said he had no direct knowledge or indirect knowledge. Could you tell us, Mr. Longstreth, has there been any discussions at the Defense Department as a result of this decision that you know about?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, I have no knowledge. The first I learned of this issue was when I read about it in the L.A. Times. Since that time, I have had no conversations on this issue with the Secretary, or with anybody else.

Mr. FRAZER. Do you agree with the decision?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, I support all of this Administration's policy decisions.

Mr. FRAZER. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Funderburk.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, Secretary Tarnoff, I'm trying to nail down the chronology and the specifics of the Iranian arms involvement. When did the Iranian forces come into Bosnia in very large numbers? Was this before or after the Clinton administration gave the green light for transshipment of Iranian arms to Bosnia?

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Funderburk, with respect, I would like to provide that information in a classified setting.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. OK. Did any agent or official of the U.S. Government, in violation of the U.N. embargo, assist in the transfer of arms from Iran to Bosnia to your knowledge, and who specifically in the U.S. Government knew about the shipments and when?

Mr. TARNOFF. On your first question, the answer is, no. On your second question, as I referred to in my testimony, there was widespread information disseminated in documents available to the Administration, and to the Congress, with respect to shipments from Iran to the Bosnian forces through Croatia.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Once the Clinton administration knew of the shipments from Iran, why was Congress not notified at that time?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, my recollection is really very clear that Congress was notified through documents made available to the leadership and the competent committees that there was shipment from several countries, including Iran going to Bosnia from Croatia.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Finally, since the United States voted as part of the U.N. Security Council for the arms embargo, did the United States knowingly violate international law by allowing the shipments?

Mr. TARNOFF. In our view, no, and that is why the Administration, working with the Congress 2 or 3 months later, endorsed the proposal according to which the United States decided not to enforce the arms embargo, despite the fact that it had been contained in a U.N. Security Council resolution.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Thank you.

Mr. ROTH. [Presiding.] Mr. Moran, would you have any questions for our witnesses?

Mr. MORAN. Well, I do, Mr. Roth, and I wanted to make some comments with my time as well. Because I think this is very much a politically motivated, bogus issue.

We knew in the Congress 2 years ago that arms were being allowed into Bosnia. Senator McCain mentioned it on the Senate floor on June 24th of 1994. There are members of this committee that were aware of it. That is why I have to question the timing of why it is coming up now. And I have to say I wish that there was more of this moral indignation shown by certain members when they were aware of the 200,000 people being massacred in Bosnia or the tens of thousands of women raped or the two million people being displaced. We had that information available, too, and chose not to, in fact, what I think would have been an appropriate manner.

The fact is that the President all along was in favor of lifting the arms embargo. The real issue was do we lift it unilaterally or multilaterally? And as far as I'm concerned, we should have lifted it unilaterally, but I think the reason it wasn't lifted at all is pri-

marily from congressional pressure not to, and of course, lack of support on the part of the European nations.

This decision to allow some arms to make it into Bosnia for people to be able to have the means of defending themselves, and it was clear the United Nations was not going to defend them, was one of the few decisions that was made from a moral basis instead of a political one.

During the Bush administration when Dubrovnik was being shelled and Admiral Boorda and others made it clear that this war was going to spread if we did not intervene, it was a politically motivated decision not to intervene.

It has been a politically motivated decision all along to defer to the United Nations knowing their lack of resolve and competency in dealing with such a situation was going to enable genocide to occur on a widespread basis in the latter part of the 20th century, which I think is going to be a stain on every country involved when the history books are written about this period of time. But we chose to stand by and let that happen out of political considerations.

This decision had no political benefit in it and, thus, I'm gratified that this Administration saw fit to do the right thing. Because it was obvious that if we did not give the Bosnian Muslims who were being slaughtered because they were Muslims, or others because they supported the concept of a multiethnic democracy, that if those countries that did not agree with those principles did not intervene, then they were going to be forced to turn to whoever would help them.

It ought to be a shame, an embarrassment for generations that the western countries who could have prevented it instead chose not to, knowing that if the only people who were going to help were Islamic countries, including extremist governments, then those people were going to play a major role in Bosnia, and in fact, were going to influence the course of that country, in the exactly opposite direction from where we would want it to go. But we have set up a situation where much of the population is bound to become radicalized right in the heart of Europe. And the Bosnian Government did not want that.

If you look at the composition of the government officials, it was multiethnic, it was committed to democracy. If we don't like the situation that exists there now we have no one to blame but ourselves.

Now, I also want to say, I think it was politically motivated to restrict the troops to one area in Bosnia. I don't think that is a sufficient amount of time; that we are going to live to regret that. And I think we have got to make a far more substantial commitment to reconstruction than the western world has been willing to do to date.

We find ourselves in a problematic situation that is largely of our own doing as far as I'm concerned, and these folks before us today are not the problem. The problem lies on the other side of the dais, those of us who knew what was going on and were incapable or unwilling to change it when it should have been changed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROTH. I thank you, Mr. Moran. I don't know if there is a question there, but everyone here has a right to make their comments. And I think I will now call on Chairwoman Meyers for her questions.

Mrs. MEYERS. Thank you, Mr. Roth. I'd like to ask some questions regarding this same topic.

I think you have said that Congress was notified of the Iranian shipments. In what form did that notice take? Who was notified?

Mr. TARNOFF. Here again, Congresswoman, I would rather describe generically the kinds of materials that were sent up, leaving for a classified setting making available this material. But through the regular, even daily intelligence documents that are made available to Members of Congress, in a variety of ways, there were many references to arms shipments from Islamic states, including Iran, that were going into Bosnia through Croatia, and we can in an appropriate setting make those materials available to you and other Members.

Mrs. MEYERS. We were not notified, however, of the Administration's decision to acquiesce to the idea that arms shipments were coming from Iran.

Mr. TARNOFF. I'm not aware that the Congress was informed specifically, but here again, one of the reasons for the decision was that we believed very strongly that such a decision was consistent with the feeling in Congress that the Bosnian Government had to be able to defend itself and that the arms embargo was something that we should all work to lift.

Mrs. MEYERS. Was there any discussion in the Administration about the possible effects of increased Iranian influence in the region?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, I can only limit my comment to what I have witnessed, what I was part of, and the answer is, yes. That's why we thought of it as a close call, as a difficult decision. We had to weigh the alternatives here of allowing the possibility that Iranian influence or Iranian personnel might marginally increase as a result of this against the very real danger in which the Bosnian Government found itself at the time. And the decision was made, and we were aware of what it was.

I must say that we are quite encouraged by the determination of the Bosnian Government since the Dayton Accords to eliminate the security, military and intelligence presence of Iranians. They have not done everything that is required, but I believe they are well on their way to doing so.

Mrs. MEYERS. Were we aware of the fact—I don't know whether it's tens or hundreds of thousands of Iranians were coming in to Bosnia. And I don't know that I was ever informed of this and I don't know how they came in. Did they come in with the arm shipments? And I would like to know where discussion took place about the possible ramifications of that.

I think many of us felt at the time that the arms embargo should be lifted. I just don't think that we thought, or certainly I did not, that Iran was going to be the principal shipper of arms; maybe the only shipper of arms, and that hundreds of people or perhaps thousands of people were going to come in with those shipments.

Mr. TARNOFF. With your permission again, what I would prefer to do is make available to you the analysis and the information which were distributed at the time. I think you will see many of those matters discussed in classified documents.

Mrs. MEYERS. I would like to ask a series of short questions, Mr. Chairman, for the record, if I may. According to the L.A. Times story, President Clinton's decision in this matter was communicated to the Croats by Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. I would prefer to, again, reserve my response to a classified setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. How were our two ambassadors informed of the President's decision? Did they receive an instruction cable from Washington?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, if I could provide that in a classified setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. And also I would like to know whose signature was on that document or on that cable.

Mr. TARNOFF. I will, again, provide what we can in a classified setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. What precisely did they say to President Tudjman of Croatia when they passed along the President's decision?

Mr. TARNOFF. Here again, the reference would be to classified communications, and I would like to provide it in an appropriate setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. According to an April 17th story in the L.A. Times, President Tudjman of Croatia initially was confused about the U.S. position as communicated to him by our side, and he came back to us the next day for a clarification; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. Here again, because we are talking about classified diplomatic correspondence, I would like to provide the response in a classified setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. If President Tudjman did, in fact, seek clarification from our side, can you describe those conversations to us in detail?

Mr. TARNOFF. Again, I think it would be appropriate to provide this in a classified setting because these are classified documents.

Mrs. MEYERS. And finally, if the Croats did, in fact, seek clarification from our side, was Washington consulted before you responded to their questions? If Washington was consulted, can you describe how those consultations took place and who was involved?

Mr. TARNOFF. Here again the exchanges were of a classified nature and we will provide it in such a setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. ROTH. Well, and I thank Chairwoman Meyers for her questions.

I'm going to call on Mr. Hyde, but before I do, let me say we have reams of paper here on this particular issue. One item from the L.A. Times this morning states that the Croats approached our Ambassador Peter Galbraith and special envoy to the Balkans, Ambassador Charles Redman, to ask whether the Clinton administration would object to the establishment of an Iranian arms pipeline. And I was just wondering if the report here in the newspaper is correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. Let me say that it is true that we were approached by President Tadjman with regard to our attitude concerning the shipment of arms from countries, including Iran, but not limited to Iran, through Croatia to Bosnia.

Mr. ROTH. But Iran was on that list?

Mr. TARNOFF. Iran was mentioned as one of the countries.

Mr. ROTH. To clear out the smoke and the haze, maybe you could just give us your categorical assurance that the idea originated with the Croatians and not within our own government. You are under oath here this morning, and I think if you could just give us that categorical assurance, I think that would answer a lot of questions.

Mr. TARNOFF. To the extent of anything that I knew at the time or know now, the initiative did lie with the Croatians, yes.

Mr. ROTH. And wasn't planted by our government?

Mr. TARNOFF. No.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say there is a policy question here that cannot forever be buried behind classified documents. The introduction of the most radical Nation in the world—and notice I don't say Muslim Nation. They are, but they are the most radical Nation, a terrorist Nation, into the Balkans in force with weapons to give them a foothold in that most volatile part of the world is incredible folly in my judgment.

Now, if any congressional leaders knew about this at the time, they ought to be identified, and if they failed to complain or raise holy hell about injecting this poison into this volatile part of the world, I would like to know about it. There were some dozen countries, as I recall, Muslim countries that participated in Desert Storm that could reasonably be asked to provide weapons for the Bosnians, not Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan. There is a long list of sources if you really want to stop the carnage and level the playing field.

Senator Dole and myself introduced legislation to lift the embargo, and we were told repeatedly by the Administration and by the agency that we couldn't do it. It would embarrass our allies; that the Brits and the French would go home. It just couldn't be done. Nice idea, we can't do it. Don't arm the Bosnians.

Meanwhile, through the back door—and we are looking out the front door—we are facilitating through inaction the entrance, the entry of the radical Islamic State of Iran in that part of the world.

Yes, it was—Mr. Moran has gone—yes, it was the right thing to do to help the Muslims, the Bosnian Muslims, but not that way. Not through Iran. That compounds a terrible problem.

Well, that is my statement and not a question. But Mr. Tarnoff, may I ask you about the initial round of conversations with the Croatians in which the United States signaled that it would not object to the establishment of an Iranian arms pipeline? Did we ever have further conversations with the Croatians, the Bosnians, the Iranians or anyone working for any of these countries about how things were going? How was this progressing?

Mr. TARNOFF. First of all, let me say, Mr. Hyde, with respect to your opening statement that Iran had had a presence in Bosnia before the conversation with President Tadjman took place. Again,

we can provide to you in a different setting what the previous presence of Iranian advisors was, but it is not as if the Iranian presence in Bosnia began as a result of the conversation that Ambassador Galbraith had with President Tudjman.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Tarnoff, taking that statement, and I do, sure, they were looking for help from anybody that would give it to them. And we should have been helping them, thinking of ways to help them without leaving them to the tender mercies of Iran. Don't you agree?

Mr. TARNOFF. I agree that by working to lift the arms embargo multilaterally we were working in that direction. Also at the same time—and we can provide more information for you separately—there were other countries involved in the effort to supply the forces of the Bosnian Government during this period of time. The outside support was not limited to Iran.

Mrs. MEYERS. If the gentleman would yield for a quick question.

Mr. HYDE. Surely.

Mrs. MEYERS. Since it is obvious that Administration officials have discussed all of this with the L.A. Times and other media, I would like to know why they can't give the answers to us this morning.

Mr. TARNOFF. Well, Congresswoman, the Administration officials who discussed this with the L.A. Times are not represented here today. And I think that because of the classified nature of the information that we are, of course, willing to provide, I have to respectfully request that we present it to you in an appropriate setting.

Mrs. MEYERS. Could I ask who those officials are?

Mr. TARNOFF. I know nothing more about them than the references to them—not by name, I might add—in the Los Angeles Times. I don't know who the reporters talked to.

Mrs. MEYERS. Is the story being leaked secretly or are there open discussions with news media regarding this?

Mr. TARNOFF. There is no attempt, deliberate or otherwise, by the leadership of this Administration to provide information to the press or the public through these channels. These leaks are undertaken or these conversations are undertaken at the initiative of officials who have made their own, I think, incorrect and inappropriate decisions for themselves.

Mr. HYDE. Well, if I may take my time back, although I enjoyed the gentlewoman's colloquy, I wonder if I could have an answer to my question, which is after the initial round of conversations with the Croatians, did we ever have further conversations with them or the Bosnians or the Iranians or anyone working for these countries about how things were going?

Mr. TARNOFF. There were never any conversations or contacts between the United States and Iran at any level during any part of this episode. As a matter of regular discussion, we were, obviously, very much concerned about the situation in Bosnia. We were in touch with the Bosnian Government about their military situation. I would have to review the record to see whether the specific question of Iran did come up in the conversations immediately following the provisions of arms that were the subject of the conversation between Ambassador Galbraith and President Tudjman.

Mr. HYDE. So the answer is "maybe"?

Mr. TARNOFF. The answer is that I will have to look at the record and see what we have for you.

Mr. HYDE. Were we ever, again, asked by anybody whether we would object to a particular armed shipment, to additional arms shipments or to some change in the policy that we had acquiesced in?

Mr. TARNOFF. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Were we at any time asked by anyone to help implement the Iran arms pipeline or to help pave the way for the delivery of arms to Bosnia and Croatia? Did we facilitate, not just turn the lights off, but did we provide military intelligence to facilitate this transfer of arms?

Mr. TARNOFF. No, not at any time.

Mr. HYDE. An April 17th story in the L.A. Times states that on at least one occasion Ambassador Redman intervened with the Croats to have them expedite the passage of a convoy that may have contained Iranian arms. Did Ambassador Redman, in fact, urge the Croats to let the convoy pass?

Mr. TARNOFF. At no time whatsoever. Ambassador Redman was, however, very concerned about the blockages that were occurring to humanitarian convoys, most of which were coming into Bosnia from Croatia and he did on numerous occasions raise the issue with the Croatian authorities and sometimes with the Bosnian Serb representatives who were also impeding these convoys.

He did so, however, with regard to convoys which had been assembled by the United Nations, by nongovernmental organizations, that had been inspected by the various authorities. He did intervene therefore on behalf of convoys, but strictly when it pertained to humanitarian ones.

Mr. HYDE. Then you deny the April 17th story in the L.A. Times?

Mr. TARNOFF. I do.

Mr. HYDE. Do we have your categorical assurances that apart from the conversations with the Croats that have been reported in the press and that you have discussed here today, the United States did nothing else to facilitate the delivery of Iranian arms to Bosnia and Croatia?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, you do.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Hyde. Mr. Longley.

Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your liberties in allowing me to participate this morning. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state for the record that I was one of the few Republicans to vote with the Administration opposing lifting the arms embargo, and dating back as far as December 1994, which was fully a month before I was sworn in as a Member of Congress, I participated in any number of classified briefs. And there have been, without going into detail in both open hearings and closed hearings, there were any number of references to leakage. But at no time was there any specific reference to an opening of the door for violation of the arms embargo, particularly by Iran. And I can guarantee you it would have provoked a reaction not just by myself, but any number of people who understand full well the possibility of transferring arms without at the same time providing the

technical assistance that would be necessary to instruct the Bosnians in how to operate those weapons systems.

And so I welcome a very careful review, Mr. Chairman, of the Congress' relationships with the Administration on this very sensitive issue, because my conjecture is that the record will not reflect any acknowledgment or even a mention of a change in policy vis-a-vis Iran. There is some reference, as I recall, to the question of leakage, but nothing in any way that suggests that we were affirmatively aware of specific shipments of arms from Iran. And I would have viewed that as a grievous possible issue to deal within the course of reviewing our policy.

Mr. Longstreth, prior to November 1994, and consistent with the acknowledged policy of not objecting to Iranian arms transfers to Bosnia, did the Administration adopt a conscious policy of permissiveness in enforcing the arms embargo in other respects?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. Congressman, I have no personal knowledge of any such policy.

Mr. LONGLEY. Mr. Tarnoff, your prepared testimony refers to areas such as prisoners, freedom of movement, and the sensitive issue of war crimes that the accomplishments are not what they should be. Isn't it a fact with respect to freedom of movement that the parties are not at all cooperating in the free movement of personnel across borders?

Mr. TARNOFF. It is certainly true, Congressman, that the Bosnian Serbs in particular have opposed the return of refugees to their original areas when these areas are under Bosnian Serb control.

Mr. LONGLEY. Isn't it also a fact that both the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serb Government make no pretense whatsoever of wishing to abide by the purposes of the Dayton Agreement with respect to that question or with respect to the cooperative relationship between the two? That they are each intent on maintaining their separate ethnic identity as a Nation.

Mr. TARNOFF. Not with respect to the Bosnian Government. I think the Bosnian Government is committed to trying to reestablish a multiethnic state. There is already, of course, within the Federation a Croatian as well as Muslim component. There are Serb members of the Serb authorities in the Bosnian Government in fairly high positions, not many but there are some.

So, I don't believe that any comparison can be made between the attitude of Bosnian Serbs, which is quite restrictive, with that of the Bosnian Government, which I think retains the ideal of trying to preserve a multiethnic state.

Mr. LONGLEY. At the same time, Mr. Tarnoff, isn't it true that just a week or two ago the Croatian Government arrested a five or six-person assassination team that was targeting Mr. Abdic formerly of Bihac and it apparently has been established that they have ties to the Bosnian security apparatus?

Mr. TARNOFF. I am not aware of that. I am aware of the news reports, but not any confirming reports.

Mr. LONGLEY. Have you initiated any review of that arrest and/or the facts that might be derived from it?

Mr. TARNOFF. I have not seen such reports, but I will look to see whether any review has been made and provide that to you on a classified basis.

Mr. LONGLEY. I am very surprised at your response because the press is openly acknowledging that the five individuals of the six-person team—excuse me, it was a six-person team, five of them were arrested with arms, including explosives, rocket-propelled grenades. They were staged along the route that Mr. Abdic was expected to travel from his position of safe haven with the Croatian Government, and it appears that there is a very clear connection with the Bosnian security apparatus. At least that is what is acknowledged in the press. I would hope the Administration would take a serious look at it.

Mr. TARNOFF. We will do so.

Mr. LONGLEY. One or two more questions, Mr. Chairman. The elections are scheduled for September. When do we begin our withdrawal plans for the American forces?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I'd have to take the question for the record, Congressman. I know, as I mentioned earlier, that SHAPE is just now starting to look at some of those issues, but I don't believe that any formal withdrawal plans have been prepared.

Mr. LONGLEY. So you are suggesting that the American forces that are now in Bosnia that understand that they will not be there beyond December have not begun planning for their withdrawal?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. My understanding, Congressman, is that those folks are focused on their mission, which is to implement the Bosnia peace agreement, and that is the focus of the IFOR commander and the subordinate commanders and the troops. A number of them just arrived only 30 or 40 days ago. Their focus is on the mission. I can assure you as the year wears on the troops will start to focus on the withdrawal and the redeployment.

Mr. LONGLEY. Are you aware that it could easily take 3 to 6 months just to plan for the withdrawal?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I'm aware that planning for the withdrawal and indeed implementing the withdrawal will take some period of weeks or months, yes.

Mr. LONGLEY. And is it conceivable that we will begin planning for the withdrawal prior to the conduct of the elections in September?

Mr. LONGSTRETH. I have no doubt that the beginning stages of that plan will begin before the elections, yes.

Mr. LONGLEY. At the same time, Mr. Tarnoff, you testified early there have been no steps undertaken to initiate equipping and training with the Bosnian forces; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. That is correct.

Mr. LONGLEY. Would it seem logical in light of the situation, including the lack of compliance with many aspects of the Dayton Agreement, that the Bosnian Government would defer from any equipping and training issues given the prospect that we could be leaving as early as November or December?

Mr. TARNOFF. I think, Congressman, I see it the other way, and that is the pressure is now on the Bosnian Government to comply fully with the Dayton Accords, including the requirement to make sure that all foreign forces have gone, because the sooner that they comply, the sooner that it will be possible for us to proceed with direct benefit to the Bosnian Government, which derives from the equipping and training program.

Mr. LONGLEY. But yet you just acknowledged that we have not seen complete withdrawal of Iranian personnel and here we are almost into May and the agreement was signed last November?

Mr. TARNOFF. It was initialed last November and signed in December.

Mr. LONGLEY. So, 6 months after the fact of the agreement we still are not seeing compliance in terms of the evacuation of the Iranian personnel from Bosnia?

Mr. TARNOFF. We have seen substantial reductions in Iranians, but we have not been satisfied on that issue as yet, that is correct.

Mr. LONGLEY. I would just suggest for the record that it is clear that we aren't doing the equipping and training or that the forces that are loyal or cooperative with us aren't, but there is very clearly going to be equipping and training going on and the question is who. And I would just submit that for the record.

What really concerns me is I see a tendency on the part of the Administration to fail to acknowledge very basic facts that relate to the conduct of our operations in Bosnia. If the Administration won't acknowledge where we are, then I don't know that we really know where we're going. And I submit that with 20-, 25,000 troops involved, the continuing presence of the Iranians in flagrant violation of the agreement that we have is a very serious problem afoot.

It is clear to me that militarily General Nash and the 1st Division have done an incredible job of securing military compliance with the agreement. But yet on civilian and economic and political issues, I think we have an awful long way to go. And I would suggest that the Administration's lack of awareness of these basic facts suggests to me that you are not serious about withdrawing American forces by the end of the year and that there may, in fact, be plans underway or contingencies being evaluated that will result in a continuation of American influence in violation of the promise that the President made to the American public.

Mr. TARNOFF. That's not the case, Congressman.

Mr. LONGLEY. I guess we will have to see.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Consistency is a very important element, I believe, for an individual to adhere to as well as a Nation to adhere to. I was just wondering, as we were going back and forth here in the question-and-answer period, when and how did we apprise our NATO allies of our green light position; that is, allowing Iran to send arms into Bosnia?

Mr. TARNOFF. I'll have to take that question, Mr. Roth. I'm not aware of the subsequent conversations that may or may not have taken place. But in any case, it would have transpired in diplomatic channels and I'll have to review the record and get back to you.

Mr. ROTH. You see the reason I was asking, Mr. Secretary, is because we have a policy of isolating Iran. In fact, we have a unilateral embargo on Iran. In fact, we are seeking to extend that. We have reported a bill out of this committee that takes us into extraterritoriality, which has the Europeans very upset. And I was wondering if the Europeans had seen a contradiction in your policy. On the one hand the United States wants to isolate Iran, and on the other hand we have a policy of not opposing Iran's arms ship-

ments into Bosnia. And I was wondering what their reaction was, because we have this legislation coming up relating to Iran.

Mr. TARNOFF. I would have reviewed the diplomatic traffic at the time. Let me tell you that since the press reports have emerged earlier this month with regard to this incident and this transaction, we have not heard anything from the Europeans with regard to an attack on our position or a change of perception of our position. I think the Europeans understand full well, whether they agree or not. And unfortunately, they don't agree sufficiently on policy toward Iran. Two years ago, the United States was dealing with an emergency situation in a particular circumstance. We have not in the course of the past 2 or 3 weeks, heard any complaints from the Iranians that we were being inconsistent once this—

Mr. ROTH. You mean the Europeans?

Mr. TARNOFF. I am sorry, from the Europeans.

Mr. ROTH. Are they, the Europeans, more in step with us in terms of isolating Iran? Are they more cooperative than 6 months ago?

Mr. TARNOFF. Generally speaking, the answer is, yes. Probably because they have learned either through information we have provided or as a result of actions taken by the Iranians that this is a regime which is determined to challenge our interests as well as theirs.

A case in point was the absolutely outrageous statements made by the Government of Iran on the occasion of the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. I think that that revelation about the true intentions of the Iranian Government did hit home in European capitals as well.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hamilton, if I might mention to the panelists, we're winding up in a few minutes. Please be patient with us.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As I indicated earlier, I, myself, have some questions about the delivery of these arms by Iran, but I also want to state that it is my recollection that there was very widespread knowledge, both in public and classified sources, about Iran's arms shipments to Bosnia.

I read, not as regularly as I should, but I read the NID and I think the NID is available to all members of this committee. And it is my clear impression that the National Intelligence Daily reported regularly on these Iranian shipments. And I don't think anyone reading the press carefully in 1994 and 1995 could doubt that such arms shipments were occurring. I think my recollection is correct. And at the same time, I cannot recall any objection from any Member of Congress at the time concerning the Iranian arms shipments.

In other words, my impression is that it was broadly known through both private and public sources that these shipments were taking place, and I don't recall any objection to them.

Mr. HYDE. Would the gentleman yield just for a minute?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Hyde, I certainly will, but I want to ask the question, do you—did you have Members asking you about these Iranian arms shipments and objecting to them during this period?

Mr. TARNOFF. I don't recall any such inquiries during that period of time, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. I yield.

Mr. HYDE. I just want to comment to my good friend, Mr. Hamilton. There are two questions here. The one that you are dealing with is was there knowledge of the fact that Iranian arms were being introduced into Bosnia. And I think there is pretty much of a consensus here that, yes, that information was available and even publicly available.

But the real question that troubles some of us is the U.S.' role in facilitating, through turning the lights off or whatever they want to call that policy, facilitating the introduction of an Iranian influence with weapons and personnel, training and intelligence into that volatile part of the world. And it is the U.S.' role that really raises the questions, at least to this Member, and I thank Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I don't pretend to know all the answers here. My understanding of these facts will come out over a period of time. I think it is the Administration's position that there was no facilitation involved in any way. Knowledge perhaps, but not facilitation. But that is for them to state and I know they will have plenty of time to respond to that.

Mr. Chairman, may I just get on the record here on the upcoming elections. You put a lot of confidence in those elections and a lot of hope that they will be meaningful elections. Now, they are supposed to take place when, in September now? Is that what is thought of?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, Mr. Hamilton, in September.

Mr. HAMILTON. They are going to cost quite a bit of money, apparently, \$150 million or more dollars.

Mr. TARNOFF. There are varying estimates at this point. I think the actual figures will be substantially less.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who is going to pay for that?

Mr. TARNOFF. The OSCE is the supervising organization. Ambassador Robert Frowick, retired foreign service officer, is in charge of this operation and, therefore, we will pay a share of it. I'm not sure of what the exact portion of the U.S.' share is, but once OSCE and Ambassador Frowick certify that the conditions exist for the elections to take place, then obviously within the context of the OSCE deliberations the United States will be involved.

Mr. HAMILTON. He cannot certify those conditions exist today, as I understand it.

Mr. TARNOFF. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. But you are reasonably confident that elections can take place by September?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, I am, Mr. Hamilton. Ambassador Frowick was back 10 days ago. He reported that increasingly he is able to establish contact with the responsible officials throughout the country. And he also believes that there is increasing international support in the form of money that will be made available. Also, in terms of the hundreds of election monitors who would be enlisted by the OSCE to keep track of these elections.

Mr. HAMILTON. And then, finally, Mr. Chairman, the indications are that half of the prewar population are refugees or displaced

people. An enormous refugee problem, it seems to me. Could you just comment on the extent of that problem and how you think it's going to be dealt with.

Mr. Dine, you have had a relaxed morning.

Mr. DINE. Mr. Hamilton, if I could just say a word on elections and then go to your question about refugees and displaced people.

The U.S. Agency for International Development is not directly funding the OSCE's role in the Bosnian election effort. We are going to be working closely with OSCE on this election. And to complement the OSCE's election efforts we are going to be engaged on our own in the following areas: voter education, first of all; candidate training, particularly for moderate political candidates; and we are going to be helping to train local journalists in electoral coverage; and finally, as you have indicated and Secretary Tarnoff indicated, election monitoring.

So these are going to be important parts of the whole dimension of the issue. Now, for refugees and displaced people, yes, you are correct. Half the nation is scattered, and that is why we have decided as our strategy to help people to come back to where they once lived by rebuilding, repairing shelter.

Chairman GILMAN. If I might interrupt the gentleman. How many refugees are there, an estimate?

Mr. DINE. Certainly over a million, I think, that are not only—well, it's difficult to know where they are. They are displaced people if they are just in Bosnia. They are refugees if they are outside Bosnia. And so many of them are in Germany, Austria, other European countries.

Chairman GILMAN. But there are at least a million.

Mr. DINE. At least.

Mr. HAMILTON. The United Nations estimates 2.5 million refugees and displaced people.

Mr. DINE. And displaced people. So, we must attract people back to where they once lived. In order to get them to come back we need to ensure that there is infrastructure, electricity, running water, safe drinking water. We must ensure that there is infrastructure. That is why we are working on emergency shelter programs. That is why we are working with municipalities. That is why also we are trying to create jobs for a country that is so devastated and unemployed.

And as we do that, we are going to stay true to our objective throughout central eastern Europe which is to create a private sector because it is going to be only through the private sector that real jobs are not only created, but sustained.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dine. Just a few questions, then we will let our panelists go on their way. Is it accurate to state that no one in our government ever approached a third party to suggest that they suggest to the Croatians, to the Bosnians, Iranians, that they consider establishing an arms pipeline from Iran or to tell them that we would not object if that were to happen? Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. TARNOFF. It is to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Did the Administration do anything to help get the Iranian arms in? Did we pass along, for example, intelligence information to anyone that would be useful with regard to

the arms pipeline, or did we arrange for gaps in international arms interdiction efforts to facilitate particular arms delivery, and did we coordinate any of the shipments?

Mr. TARNOFF. None whatsoever, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The answer to all of those would be in a negative?

Mr. TARNOFF. We did not.

Chairman GILMAN. I have been told that Ambassadors Galbraith and Redman are now in Washington; is that correct?

Mr. TARNOFF. No, Ambassador Redman was here last week. He is now back in Bosnia.

Chairman GILMAN. What about Ambassador Galbraith?

Mr. TARNOFF. Ambassador Galbraith I think is in Croatia or somewhere in Europe. He is not in Washington.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you expect them here within the next few weeks?

Mr. TARNOFF. If the purpose of your query, Mr. Chairman, is to see whether it might be possible for them to be available for meetings, the answer is, yes, and we can talk about scheduling and conditions.

Chairman GILMAN. In other words, you would be willing to coordinate?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, of course.

Chairman GILMAN. In response to a number of questions you stated that you would not be able to answer in an unclassified forum, would you be willing to give us a classified briefing later on this week?

Mr. TARNOFF. We will provide the information. I am leaving tomorrow actually for a Federation meeting in Bonn, but we will do an inventory of the questions and make sure that the information is provided to you as soon as possible.

Chairman GILMAN. When will you be returning?

Mr. TARNOFF. Over the weekend.

Chairman GILMAN. Since you have indicated Mr. Talbott is the only individual within the State Department who can answer some of our questions, will you try to make him available to testify about these matters before our committee in the near future?

Mr. TARNOFF. I will discuss that with Mr. Talbott.

Chairman GILMAN. Just one last remark. I'd like to, first of all, thank the witnesses for appearing today. Although I'm disappointed in the lack of substantive response to some of our questions, perhaps it may not now be said that this hearing raises as many questions as have been answered, and among those are what harm has come to Bosnia and to our alliances as a result of this exercise? Why did the Administration go along with an Iran connection? Why not suggest that only other countries be encouraged to supply the Bosnians and that only countries be encouraged. Isn't it the case that we have caused serious harm to the likelihood of success in Bosnia with this new Iranian connection? Why was there no consultation with Congress with regard to this proposal?

Let me say in closing that we will continue to review this issue in this committee, and in cooperation with other committees and with the leadership of the House. We will have additional questions to pose to you and other Administration officials in writing and in

further hearings, and we will ask you to respond promptly and fully to our request for information in writing. Accordingly, this hearing is recessed.

Mr. FRAZER. Mr. Chairman, before we close the record—

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Frazer.

Mr. FRAZER.—I'd like to have a minute.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes, by all means.

Mr. FRAZER. Mr. Chairman, I would hate for us to leave this hearing with the impression that the Administration did anything wrong. And Mr. Longstreth, the purpose for my question at first was to give you an opportunity to put on the record the fact that you are not trying to separate yourself from the Administration's policy because there was much discussion this morning apparently trying to give you an opportunity to separate yourself.

I would like to ask Mr. Tarnoff, did the United States do anything in contravention to U.N. Resolution 713?

Mr. TARNOFF. The answer, Congressman, is that the United States decided that it was not inconsistent with our international obligations to refrain from enforcing the arms embargo that had been imposed by the United Nations.

And as a matter of fact, we are talking today quite a bit about incidents that occurred in the spring of 1994. As you know, working with the Administration, the Congress imposed an obligation on the Administration in November 1994, not, repeat, *not* to cooperate with any enforcement regime, United Nations or otherwise with respect to an embargo.

Mr. FRAZER. Mr. Tarnoff, the record is replete with information, both private and otherwise, that we were aware that countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others may have been sending arms to Bosnia. And of course, you heard the righteous indignation this morning from many members of this committee that give the suggestion that somehow the Administration did something wrong.

Was there any obligation on the part of the United States to intervene if, in fact, we became aware that third parties or third countries were sending arms to Bosnia? Was there any legal obligation as the result of U.N. Resolution 713?

Mr. TARNOFF. We believe the answer to that question is, no.

Mr. FRAZER. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. This hearing is recessed subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Statement of Undersecretary of State

for Political Affairs

Peter Tarnoff

House International Relations Committee

April 23, 1996

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this invitation to appear today before the committee. I also welcome the opportunity to join my colleagues from the Defense Department and USAID in a discussion of the situation in Bosnia.

Our efforts to bring peace to Bosnia through the implementation of the Dayton Accords remain well on track. In the five months since the peace agreement was initialed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, we have witnessed a remarkable transformation. In a very real sense, we are on the road from confrontation to conciliation. But that journey is in its early stages. Much work remains to be done. But I believe we can be generally encouraged by progress to date.

We have always known this task would be difficult and that there would be setbacks. But we are committed to see this through. The recent tragic loss of Secretary Brown and his mission has only reinforced our determination.

The significant impact that U.S. policy has had on this conflict is evident by remembering where we were just one year

ago. In April 1995, the Serbs held nearly 70 percent of Bosnia. International peace efforts were totally stymied. Sarajevo remained surrounded and besieged. Thousands of civilians endured tremendous deprivation. UNPROFOR, the sole source of any form of protection, was contemplating its withdrawal. Today the killing has ended, some refugees are returning home, people are being fed, clothed, and sheltered, and the peace is taking hold throughout Bosnia.

We now face the challenges not of war, but of peace. For it is the need for peace and stability in this corner of Europe, and an end to ethnic and nationalistic strife, that spurred our diplomatic efforts which culminated in the Dayton Accords. Those same objectives now prompt U.S. policy in implementing the Accords.

However, the Dayton Accords are not self-executing assurances of peace. They are simply the agreed plans by which peace can be pursued. To attain that end, we and our allies are working in concert, through military and civilian channels, to encourage the parties to live up to their commitments. We are also determined to enhance the chances for a durable peace by creating the best possible economic and security environment in Bosnia.

The Dayton Accords set out a timetable for measures to be taken by the parties. With each step, the prospects for overall success increase. From the separation of forces to the

exchange of territory to the demobilization of forces, each step builds upon the other and serves to reinforce the overall peace. With the marking of "D+90" on March 19 and the completion of territory transfer, we reached the end of the first key phase of the Dayton Accords and the start of the next: a return to normal life and preparing proper conditions for elections. The OSCE must certify conditions and set the date for Bosnia's elections. After the OSCE certifies that Bosnia is ready to hold elections, the campaign and extensive preparation for balloting will begin. Once elections are conducted, the institutions agreed at Dayton and crucial to a viable Bosnian state will have to begin functioning.

Mr. Chairman, much has been accomplished since last November. As my colleague from the Department of Defense will affirm, the forces of IFOR, under NATO command, have overseen the separation of warring forces and the territorial exchanges provided for in the Dayton Accords. In Sarajevo, for example, while the unification of formerly Serb-held parts of the city under Federation control was marred by Serb-instigated disruptions, Sarajevans can now legitimately aspire to a better life.

We have also worked very closely with our Contact Group partners, and with High Representative Carl Bildt and his staff, to coordinate our efforts for maximum effect. My colleague from USAID will describe in greater detail the civilian implementation effort.

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Yet, despite these accomplishments, compliance with certain commitments -- particularly in areas such as prisoners, freedom of movement, and the sensitive issue of war crimes -- is not what it should be. During Dayton's first phase, implementation was largely driven by IFOR. As we approach elections, the parties will shoulder a larger responsibility for success. It is therefore vital to keep the Dayton signatories -- the political leadership in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia -- focussed on the tasks ahead and the need for compliance with all terms of the Accords.

One of the most critical aspects of this effort to comply with Dayton involves a commitment by all the parties to expel foreign military and advisory personnel. In this regard, we have insisted especially that Iranian military and intelligence personnel leave Bosnia.

In recent days, there has been considerable attention paid to reports that the U.S. did not actively oppose the shipment of Iranian arms through Croatia to Bosnia two years ago. Let me review the circumstances and facts of that case.

From the outset, the Clinton Administration -- and most members of Congress -- opposed the U.N. arms embargo against Bosnia. We wanted the arms embargo to be lifted multilaterally because if the U.S. had lifted the embargo unilaterally, U.N. sanctions regimes against Libya and Iraq would have been weakened, and UNPROFOR would have departed Bosnia, leaving that

country at greater short-term risk and requiring the U.S. to intervene to help extract UNPROFOR troops in difficult and dangerous circumstances. In the spring of 1994, the Government-held areas of Bosnia were under siege and the newly-established Muslim-Croat Federation was in a precarious state.

In April 1994, we were asked by the Government of Croatia whether the U.S. would object if Croatia were to allow arms shipments to the Bosnian Government from other countries, including Iran, to transit Croatian territory. Given the military urgency of the situation facing the Federation on the ground and the imbalance in favor of Bosnian Serb forces, the Administration did not object to possible arms shipments to the Bosnians through Croatia. We decided that we would neither approve of nor object to such shipments; U.S. representatives were told to respond to further inquiries by the Croatian Government by stating they had "no instructions" on the matter. The U.S. has no contact with the Government of Iran on this matter.

Beginning in May 1994, the U.S. intelligence community began to report flights by Iranian transport planes to Croatia with cargoes intended for Bosnia and which were believed to contain military as well as humanitarian supplies. These reports were contained in an intelligence document that is provided on a daily basis to the relevant Congressional committees; the Leadership and its staff had access to this daily report.

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In October 1994, as an alternative to unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, the Congress -- with strong bipartisan support and Administration backing -- enacted legislation making it illegal for the U.S. to use appropriated funds to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia; Congress was aware of Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia at the time. Iranian shipments were not excluded from the applicability of this legislation, which took effect in November.

Our actions were consistent with the will of Congress, as subsequently expressed in the October 1994 legislation that barred us from using appropriated funds to enforce the arms embargo against Bosnia, while avoiding crossing the line of unilaterally abrogating a binding Security Council resolution by providing arms to the Bosnian Government directly or indirectly.

The good news was that the valiant armed forces of Bosnia did manage to hold out and hold on to their territory. Because they did so, it was possible in 1995 for NATO to take action and the U.S. to forge an agreement in Dayton which gives the people of Bosnia from all three communities the best chance they have had in years for peace.

On November 23, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1021 providing for lifting the embargo as a result of the Dayton Accords. Since then, the Bosnian Government has been cooperating with us and is acting to comply with its

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obligation under Dayton to remove foreign forces. The presence and influence of Iran in Bosnia is substantially reduced and the Bosnian Government understands that the U.S. has conditioned implementation of our Train and Equip Program on compliance with the foreign forces provisions of the Dayton Accords. This point was driven home to the Bosnians by both the Administration and Congress.

The Dayton Accords included a key incentive for the parties to forsake continued warfare and preserve peace. That was the promise and opportunity for the parties to form partnerships with the international community in the economic reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All sides have been exhausted by this bitter conflict. While armies can be demobilized and weapons removed to limited cantonments, it is a much more difficult task for governments to provide soldiers real jobs, let alone a secure livelihood. Reconstruction aid is an essential investment for the future peace of the region. We are using it to break the psychology of war.

The successful Donors' Conference held earlier this month in Brussels both reinforced the international community's recognition of this urgent need and signaled that fiscal benefits would soon flow from the parties' adherence to the Dayton Accords. The conference generated over \$1.2 billion in new commitments for reconstruction, and, along with \$600 million pledged in December, met the international community's overall needs target of \$1.8 billion for 1996.

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Congressional support for the President's \$198 million supplemental package was crucial to the success of the Conference, and in particular, allowed us to "leverage" more than three times our pledge from other bilateral donors. With the supplemental, and other new funds, we were able to pledge \$219 million in new monies at the Brussels Conference for reconstruction and associated programs such as police, demining, and elections, for a total commitment to reconstruction and related funding of \$281 million for 1996. This is approximately half of our total commitment of \$550 million to civilian implementation this fiscal year for Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia. Of this total, \$200 million is pure economic reconstruction assistance, representing the first tranche of the President's commitment of \$600 million for economic reconstruction over several years.

Concrete benefits to the people of Bosnia from the Dayton Accords, the so-called "peace dividend", will ensure that the Bosnian people acknowledge the improvement in their lives at the ballot box this summer. We are seeing the re-birth of Sarajevo, but this renaissance is severely hampered by the devastated infrastructure. This is true throughout Bosnia. Our priorities in the coming weeks are to ensure that the funds committed at Brussels flow quickly, that people -- particularly the tens of thousands of demobilized troops -- begin to be employed, and that the various reconstruction programs are properly coordinated. The European Union, which is providing the lion's share of the funding, the World Bank, and High

Representative Bildt, all have roles here, but the US is and must exercise leadership as well to ensure that the job gets done.

Direct aid alone cannot assure peace. Economic life depends on trade. The principle that trade enhances peace led Secretary Brown and his party to the Balkans earlier this month. This notion did not perish in the tragedy above Dubrovnik. We are committed to continue pursuing peace through commerce, both as a remembrance of the Brown delegation and as an effective tool to achieve lasting stability in the Balkans.

The Muslim-Croat Federation is a cornerstone of the Dayton Accords. It plays an essential role in preventing a renewal of fighting between these communities and channeling their differences into the political arena. In addition, the Federation provides the necessary counter-balance to the Republika Srpska. The entire legal structure of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina presumes a healthy, functioning Federation.

Given its importance for the success of the Dayton accords, the United States has made the Federation the focus of a broad-based program of political, technical and economic support. Along with our partners, we have conducted a series of high-level meetings in Rome, Geneva, Moscow, and Sarajevo, devoted primarily to the solution of Federation problems. I will lead the American delegation to the next such meeting this Thursday in Bonn.

On April 3 in Sarajevo, Acting Assistant Secretary Kornblum convened the first meeting of the Federation Forum, a regular U.S.-led mechanism for more intensive, regular discussions with the two parties on Federation issues.

The groundwork for a lasting peace depends not just on elections but also on creating an effective deterrent to renewed Bosnian Serb aggression against the Federation, as well as balancing the number of arms throughout the region.

Moreover, Dayton Agreement commits the Parties to a series of confidence building and arms control measures. These measures aim to build transparency and confidence and achieve balanced and stable defense forces at the lowest levels consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. But even with full implementation of these measures, Federation forces will still be at a disadvantage. That is why we are committed to leading an international effort to train and equip Federation forces so that they have an effective deterrent and self-defense capability.

Finally, it is impossible to envision a lasting peace that does not take account of the atrocities carried out over the past years. We do not advocate revenge, for this will only breed more contempt and violence. Nor can we hold groups collectively responsible for the evil actions of individuals in

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their midst. This is why the United Nations, at the urging of this Administration, established the International Tribunal at The Hague. Since the Dayton Accords were signed, 57 persons have been indicted, six taken into custody, and investigators have spent thousands of hours in Bosnia and its neighbors seeking evidence.

Compliance with the International Tribunal was made one of the touchstones of the Dayton Accords. Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade have each taken steps to improve its cooperation with the Tribunal since last year. But the lack of Bosnian Serb cooperation with the Tribunal continues as the most glaring example of non-compliance with the Accords.

In conclusion, it must be remembered that it was American leadership that produced the relative but real improvements that we can now observe in Bosnia. And American leadership, in cooperation with our friends and allies, will see us through the challenges and opportunities I have described.

When we and our NATO allies committed IFOR to Bosnia, we made it clear to the former warring parties that they were ultimately responsible for implementing the peace agreement. By limiting IFOR's deployment to one year, NATO signaled that it would not substitute for real progress by the parties toward achieving a lasting peace. Certainly the full implementation process will take longer than one year, but we are counting on the parties to build on the progress made during this critical

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first year so as to continue to consolidate peace and develop institutions after IFOR departs. The Agreement reached at Dayton envisioned a gradual process of reconciliation and institution building that the U.S. intends to support.

Given the remarkable advances that have been made in the past year -- and the results of American leadership during that period -- this Administration intends to persevere. As President Clinton has said repeatedly, it is in the U.S. national interest to help bring peace to Bosnia. We will work with others to achieve that goal.

**Testimony of Thomas A. Dine
USAID Assistant Administrator
for Europe and the New Independent States
before the House International Relations Committee
Washington, D.C.
April 23, 1996**

I am pleased to appear before this Committee to offer an overview of the role the United States and, specifically, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is playing in the reconstruction of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Last month, I visited Bosnia Herzegovina as the head of the United States delegation to the Sarajevo Information Conference on Bosnia Reconstruction, co-sponsored by the World Bank and the European Union. I also travelled throughout the country. Clearly, the extent and wantonness of the destruction is haunting. Sarajevo of today has been likened to post-war Berlin and to Beirut of a decade ago. A tour of the front-line towns and villages of Bosnia drives home the point that homes, farms, businesses, schools, roads, and -- most poignantly -- the legacy of tolerance and multi-ethnicity were utterly destroyed. Simply put, the country imploded.

No one who has been to Sarajevo or to Mostar suggests that what was, will be again. But, it is imperative that the fortitude and resilience of the population that did survive be highlighted and rechanneled for the sake of rebuilding and rejuvenating the country. And, as I travelled I did see the early signs of regeneration -- farms being prepared for cultivation, small and medium-sized businesses restarting, new glass replacing empty windows or plastic sheeting, debris being carted away, and so on.

And, perhaps the most gratifying sight of all was the removal of containers and other makeshift materials that had been Sarajevo's crude, marginal protection from Serb sniper fire for the last four years. This was a demonstration of the belief -- if not the guarantee -- that peace is truly in the offing.

Still, this visit also reinforced my belief that time is of the essence if the donor community is going to be successful in helping the people of Bosnia to become stakeholders in peace. Right now Bosnia is operating at only 5 percent of its pre-war industrial capacity, and only about 20 percent of Bosnians are employed. The problem is soon to be compounded by the demobilization of an additional 150,000 soldiers. Without employment, without visible proof that reconstruction is underway, and without restoration of a civil society, it is not unthinkable that war will resume. As gratifying as the early signs of self-help may be to us all, the problems are simply too massive for Bosnians to address without abiding, outside assistance.

IFOR is scheduled to depart, but to do so with a proper legacy in tact and under conditions of peace and security, reconstruction has to be a reality, not a promise. General William Nash, Commander of Task Force Eagle, in no uncertain terms, told me that reconstruction is a "force protection issue."

No one can say for sure that reconstruction will ultimately prevent a resumption of war. But, it is patently true, that failure to promote reconstruction and failure to ameliorate the sense of loss and despair will surely set the stage for this war's reignition. Of this last point, I am absolutely certain.

Transition from Humanitarian to Development Assistance

It is important to note that the international community's response to the tragedy in Bosnia did not begin with the peace accords. I am proud that the U.S. Agency for International Development has conducted both emergency humanitarian programs and modest longer-term rehabilitation projects in the region throughout the conflict. The greatest testament to the humanitarian efforts comes from the fact that, despite bitter warfare, massive refugee flows, and severe winters, there have been very few deaths caused by malnutrition, disease, or failure to meet essential needs.

The United States Government's humanitarian programs, totalling over \$1 billion over the last five years, are managed largely by USAID and channelled through 25 different nongovernmental organizations providing food, emergency medical care, water, sanitation and winterization for the most vulnerable groups, regardless of political orientation or ethnic background.

USAID's Food for Peace program provided over 126,000 metric tons of food aid in 1995 alone. Our Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) offered an on-the-ground presence even during the height of combat to assess and coordinate emergency efforts among nongovernmental organizations, the U.N. and other international donors.

Upon the signing of the Peace Accords in Paris, President Clinton announced a package of humanitarian and immediate small-scale reconstruction efforts to reinforce -- during the first 120 days -- the tangible benefits of peace. This "quick impact" package totaled \$85.65 million and each project has been completed or is en train. USAID was able to build on the incremental efforts made over the last two years to build a more developmental component into our assistance program, particularly in Federation areas where peace had been restored and minor reconstruction efforts were likely to endure.

Humanitarian programs will continue as necessary, albeit on a diminishing basis so that USAID's energy and resources can be most appropriately focussed on enduring reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. Our overarching goal now is to sharpen the Bosnians' own capacity to restore their economic wherewithal. Pursuant to Congressional concurrence, we envision a three-year \$600 million very targeted development program.

In effect, the assistance program has three major components: First, a reconstruction finance facility program to provide quick disbursing loans to support resumption of economic activity and creation of market-oriented employment opportunities for demobilized troops and civilians alike. Second, a municipal infrastructure and services program

to finance small-scale resumption of vital needs on a local level and, also, to stimulate employment and ease the burden on returning refugees and internally displaced. Third, a modest democracy program to augment international efforts at election planning and to contribute to early efforts to restore a civil society.

Both the reconstruction finance facility and the municipal infrastructure and services program have the added effect of contributing to a worldwide effort to redress Bosnia's crushing balance of payments problem. Further, to render these two programs successful over the long-term, technical assistance will come on stream simultaneously to address the structural policy challenges to a government that must contend not only with war-time losses, but simultaneously face a treacherous transition from a command to a market economy.

Bosnian Reconstruction Finance Facility and Economic Stabilization

The Bosnian Reconstruction Finance Facility (BRFF) serves two important purposes: (1) to provide immediate balance of payments assistance to Bosnia Herzegovina; and (2) to provide quick-disbursing financial support to Bosnian enterprises. Assisting Bosnian businesses to repair plants and equipment, obtain spare parts, get production lines rolling, and reactivate overall commerce is critical to meet the urgent need to help all Bosnians -- including returning refugees and demobilized soldiers -- to become gainfully employed and to create a normal peace-time environment as quickly as possible.

A basic reality is that the demand for funds to restart the economy is enormous. Beyond the visual evidence I saw during my visit to Bosnia, and the discussions I and my staff have had with local business leaders, the World Bank has amply documented the huge and immediate need for funds for reconstruction.

The emphasis of the BRFF is thus on quick impact. With the deposit of the grant funds into a separate dollar account of the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina will have contributed, as part of a multi-donor effort, to the government's effort to meet its reserve and monetary requirements. Even more critical to the reconstruction effort, we intend to have the first loans made to commercially viable Bosnian enterprises by mid-June.

To achieve this ambitious goal, one of the key characteristics of the first phase is to use licensed Bosnian commercial banks as agents rather than financial intermediaries. In this regard, credit decisions, based on commercial criteria, will be made by an autonomous on-lending management unit (OMU) staffed by experienced U.S. bankers and professional Bosnian staff. Bosnian commercial banks will bring loan applications of their client enterprises to the OMU for review and in return receive an origination fee for any successful loan application.

To speed the revitalization of as many Bosnian businesses as possible representing all ethnic groups, and thereby stimulate employment, the first disbursement of FY 1996 funds will place relatively few restrictions on borrower eligibility and will utilize relatively flexible credit

criteria. Loans can be used to finance the working capital, fixed asset, project finance and related import requirements of local businesses.

The BRFF will be market driven; few pre-conditions will be established for participation other than the commercial viability of the specific borrower and the loan request. Successful applicants will be those that can generate the cash flow to repay the loan, which will be on non-concessional terms and conditions. At least 87.5 percent of the funds will be for projects in the U.S. IFOR sector and Sarajevo. Enterprise borrowing eligibility criteria will give preference to (1) private sector or privatizing firms which offer high employment generation potential; (2) projects which, with minimal capital, help reactivate existing local productive capacity; (3) firms which will utilize domestic inputs and have export potential; and, (4) proposals which directly support the renovation of homes and/or businesses. The program will tend to target enterprises employing 10-500 employees, given that the maximum loan size is 1 million Deutsche Marks (DM).

Accountability

There is always concern in on-lending activities about the possibility of these funds being diverted for political or criminal purposes. Regarding the former, let me stress that no Bosnian government officials will have a final say in determining what and whether any enterprises will get a loan. Their only role, which is completely appropriate, is at the outset, to sit down with USAID officials and agree on general lending policies and criteria for the facility. We think that we have several lines of defense to prevent these loans from going for non-targetted or criminal purposes. First, seasoned U.S. bankers, assisted by Bosnian professional staff, will review every loan application based on commercial criteria and make site visits as part of the due diligence process as well as track the loans aggressively. Second, OMU agreements with participating banks will require banks to warrant in writing that borrowers are bonafide commercial entities and are also not indicted war criminals. Third, to ensure further control, there will be a concurrent audit from day one under the auspices of the USAID/IG to check participating banks and borrowers on a regular basis. Fourth, when the OMU recommends that a loan be made, the USAID Mission Director in Sarajevo must review and provide written concurrence to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina (GOBH) for any funds to be released to a borrowers' account in a Bosnian bank.

Thus, even with this emphasis on quick loan disbursement, we will not sacrifice control and accountability. Let me describe in a bit more detail our flow of funds mechanism to demonstrate that at no time can these grant funds be released without written USAID concurrence and that at all times the mechanism conforms with U.S. legislation. Upon satisfaction of conditions precedent, the grant funds will be disbursed into a separate bank account in the name of the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina (GOBH) at a U.S. bank. Dollar disbursements of the U.S. grant for the on-lending program will be used to purchase Deutsche Marks (DM), one of the legal "local currencies" in Bosnia and the preferred commercial medium of exchange. The U.S. bank will have instructions not to release any funds from the DM or BRFF account without receiving written concurrence from USAID.

U.S. Business Involvement

In a commercial lending program, we cannot know in advance which loans will be proposed and which will meet the criteria. It is also impossible to predict what the loans will be used for, particularly what level of kind of imported goods might be financed by the loans. We want to make sure that U.S. firms have every opportunity to participate. A promotional effort will be undertaken to inform U.S. companies about the program through the U.S. Department of Commerce and relevant U.S. trade associations. This effort will give American firms appropriate advance notice of Bosnian firms' intentions to procure major equipment as part of their loans. The OMU is also tasked with notifying the regional U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) Attache in Vienna of any borrower's intention to procure a single piece of equipment with a value in excess of DM 500,000. The information will be included in the USDOC computerized information network for European business opportunities.

Broader Impact of the BRFF

While our primary focus is on jump-starting economic activity and getting people back to work, we want to leave behind a sound, market-oriented banking sector which can finance the private sector. The Bosnian banking sector is fragile and severely undercapitalized, while credit skills and documentation are nascent. Through associated technical assistance, we intend to strengthen the Bosnian banking sector, working in close collaboration with the World Bank and other donors.

The introduction of market-oriented lending practices and credit evaluation techniques will help create a sound efficient financial sector serving and supporting the private sector. Commercial bank staff in Bosnia will benefit from working closely with the OMU's American technical staff. USAID will also finance additional training and technical assistance for commercial bankers and bank regulatory authorities. The former will focus on credit analysis, policy, and procedural skills to help banks act as financial intermediaries. Assistance also will be provided to the Bosnian bank regulatory authorities to strengthen their capabilities to supervise and monitor the banks based on prudential regulations.

This comprehensive package of technical assistance is viewed as important in the anticipated evolution in years two and three of the program to a more traditional credit program where the banks act as financial intermediaries. As the participating Bosnian commercial banks develop sound credit analysis skills, policies and procedures in conjunction with improved financial conditions, the OMU will evaluate individual bank performance to recommend shifting from agent status.

In summary, this structure promotes USAID's unique role in the reconstruction effort. It allows for:

- 1) the quick and efficient disbursement of funds to meet immediate balance of payments, reconstruction and employment needs of all viable segments of the commercial and industrial sectors;
- 2) USAID to establish and maintain quick and efficient controls and accountability mechanisms for program funds; and
- 3) the banking sector to strengthen its operations while not further weakening its capital base.

Economic Stabilization and Recovery

Macroeconomic stability is the first priority for achieving sustainable economic recovery. The IMF and the World Bank, respectively, have primary responsibility for the economic stabilization and recovery in Bosnia. While these two international institutions can provide essential policy advice, it must be Bosnian institutions, particularly the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance, that will implement these policies. The USG will facilitate this process and help unlock large and critical IMF and World Bank resources by providing timely and targeted technical assistance, developed in tight collaboration with the two critical institutions.

USG technical assistance is designed to accomplish the following mutually-reinforcing objectives:

- an established Currency Board which operates efficiently and with minimal disruption to the real economy,
- more tax revenue flowing to the government which is expended by the Federation, cantons, and municipalities based on an established framework of priorities and modern budgeting techniques,
- unified and effective Customs operations, and
- accelerated privatization.

Municipal Infrastructure and Services

The destruction of Sarajevo and Mostar captured the attention of the world community. But, the additional travesty of Bosnia is the severe losses incurred by small towns and cities, particularly on the front lines. With so many areas decimated and the fleeing populations still left in overcrowded shelters, in refugee camps and in cities overwhelmed by these influxes, the deprivation and concomitant restiveness of the population linger.

The Municipal Infrastructure and Services (MIS) program will direct resources to revitalizing these front-line communities. Its ultimate goal will be to stabilize these areas quickly in order to demonstrate the benefits of peace. This will relieve the pressures that the displaced people are putting on the services of the larger cities. The implementation will be managed by a U.S. firm to ensure accountability in the construction process, but the program will rely on local construction companies and materials suppliers to have the maximum impact on revitalizing the local economy.

As a starting point, USAID now has underway a \$25 million emergency shelter repair program. Using non-governmental organizations, our intention is to capitalize instantly on the spring thaw in Bosnia and provide very basic emergency repairs to single-family houses. Ultimately, over 12,000 individuals displaced from towns and cities in the U.S. sector or demobilized from the Bosnian army will be able to return home. Let me stress that our program is neither new housing construction nor housing restoration; it involves nothing grander than making a room or two habitable, repairing or replacing a roof, or weatherizing the structure so that the family can return to the house and through its own efforts complete the repairs.

Beginning this summer, the municipal infrastructure program will finance the reconstruction of community infrastructure and services. During this first construction season, it will be a direct complement to the emergency shelter program that USAID jump-started in order to be able to begin work early in the construction season. The first activities of the infrastructure program will directly support the shelter program. For example, water or electric supply will be repaired to restore services to houses that have been repaired, or access roads to the houses will be made usable.

Throughout the life of the program, infrastructure projects identified by the U.S. IFOR civilian command will receive priority consideration. Local officials will also participate in the project identification process and they will work collaboratively with the project implementers. Most of the activities will take place in the U.S. sector and in Sarajevo. Eligible projects will include minor infrastructure repair and restoration of basic services, such as water, electricity, and sanitation. We will finance road repair, telephones service reconnections, and repair of local community facilities such as schools and health centers. Of equal importance is the improvement of infrastructure that supports local economic activity.

Projects are expected to have an average cost of \$1.5 million. The program will be managed and implemented by a U.S. firm. The firm will subcontract with local construction firms, manage their work, certify construction progress, and serve as paying agent as work is completed. A concurrent auditing system will be established to assure accountability of the funds. Most MIS funds will flow as a balance of payments grant to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The funds will be placed in a separate account for MIS activities, which we expect to be denominated in Deutsche Marks (DM). Let me stress again that disbursements from the MIS separate account will require authorization by both USAID/Sarajevo officials and the designated official of the Bosnian Government. The funds will be disbursed to the American supervision contractor. Only when the American contractor and the local officials or the utility company certify the work as acceptable will the local contractor be paid.

As I have stressed, the ultimate goal of the repair of municipal infrastructure is to stabilize the front line communities. These projects will make the communities livable, at least in the most basic sense; they will generate employment; and they will help revive industries associated with construction. As families return to their homes and municipalities have the capacity to provide basic needs, farms will be replanted, businesses will reopen and survival and subsistence will give way to economic development.

Democratic Reform

Finally, the Dayton Accords call upon Bosnia Herzegovina to again become a multi-ethnic society while simultaneously making the difficult transition to a democratic society. The first benchmark in this restoration process are the elections mandated by the Dayton Accords and scheduled to take place within six months of the December Paris ceremonies.

The complexity of this process cannot be understated -- rights of return for refugees and displaced persons, the creation and enfranchisement of cantonal governments, the creation out of whole cloth of new institutions to accommodate both entities of Bosnia Herzegovina are examples of intractable issues yet to be resolved in the context of election-day demands and thereafter. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has the mandate to prepare for these elections and to deal with the attendant issues of concern. Still, the demands are great and the elections will not put to rest the burdens these fragile governmental entities have to bear.

The USG's contribution to the political transition to democracy and peace includes three prongs: elections assistance, including support for independent media; strengthening and reforming judicial institutions; and establishing governing structures.

The United States Government has directly provided funds to the OSCE for Bosnian elections. In addition, USAID and the Department of State jointly funded two advisors from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to spend over one month in Sarajevo working with the Provisional Election Commission (PEC). Direct advice has also been provided to the PEC by USAID's elections experts. USAID is currently considering a proposal from IFES to provide ongoing technical advice to the PEC through the elections.

Recognizing that free and fair elections require much more than a well-run elections administration, the U.S. is funding programs for political party-building, voter education and support for independent media. A long-term team from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) arrives this week in Bosnia Herzegovina (under National Endowment for Democracy funds), and USAID is in the process of obligating additional funds to NDI to support a broader program of political party building as well as voter education efforts. We are currently considering additional proposals for voter education programs from the International Republican Institute (IRI) and IFES.

USIA has been providing U.S.-based training for print and broadcast journalists to learn how to cover elections. USAID gave a grant to Internews, which opened an office in Sarajevo in early March, and will begin in-country training for independent radio and television this month.

USAID began a program of support to the newly created Federation Constitutional Court in June of 1995, working through the American Bar Association's Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI). In January of this year, with ABA/CEELI's assistance, the Court

was inaugurated. ABA/CEELI placed a long-term liaison in Sarajevo in December, and continues to work with judicial institutions in Bosnia Herzegovina. Most recently, it sponsored a series of workshops on issues of judicial independence.

In October of 1995, USAID signed a contract with the International City Manager's Association (ICMA) to help establish an intergovernmental finance system linking the Federation to newly created cantons to municipalities, and to strengthen the capacity of cantons and municipalities in budgeting, financial management, service delivery, and citizen relations. ICMA has fielded two of its four member long-term team, who have begun working in Zenica and Tuzla Cantons and their constituent municipalities on budgeting and financial management issues.

Conclusion

On April 12, 50 donor countries and international institutions pledged at Brussels to provide an additional \$1.2 billion for Bosnian reconstruction. With the concurrence of the United States Congress, the United States pledged \$219 million. The European Union pledged an additional \$417 million, demonstrating its commitment to bear the largest burden of the reconstruction effort. These are the commitments of donors in the first of a multi-year effort to rebuild Bosnia. The World Bank estimates that it will take more than \$5 billion of reconstruction monies over the next three years to complete the most basic of Bosnia's reconstruction needs.

I believe each of us knows that true reconstruction in Bosnia will take generations. The hardest part will be tamping down ethnic hatred and creating the incipient conditions for coexistence. No international donor, no outside military force, and not even the most tenacious of diplomats can restore peace to a society lacking the will and the imagination to envision peace even against great odds.

But, what we can do is ameliorate the worst of the despair and to ease by a small amount the ravaging effects of the destruction and deprivation of four years of warfare with the belief that peace becomes infinitely more attractive and advantageous to a war-weary population. At the very least, with the short time allotted us in Bosnia, we must help with enough material advantages and offer enough hope, that the shrill voices of the ultranationalists and extremists which would destroy Bosnia once and for all go unheeded.

**Statement of Thomas K. Longstreth
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy and Requirements and
Director, OSD Bosnia Task Force**

**before the
House International Relations Committee
Tuesday, April 23, 1996**

Status of the IFOR Deployment

Last Thursday, April 18, marked the 120th day since Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR got underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, just over four months after the Implementation Force's (IFOR's) initial deployment into Bosnia, overall implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement is proceeding well. In many ways, implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement has gone far more smoothly than we hoped or expected.

Approximately 19,000 U.S. troops are currently serving with IFOR in Bosnia. U.S. headquarters at Tuzla, in Multinational Division North (MND-N), is well-established and fully able to direct the full range of operational and support functions for the U.S. IFOR mission. U. S. troops and the troops of other countries operating in their sector continue to perform their key military tasks, including patrolling the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and its corresponding Zone of Separation (ZOS), assuring freedom of movement, and monitoring overall compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. Of note, the Russian Brigade assigned to the U.S. sector is at full strength and has been periodically conducting joint patrols with U.S. troops. All indications from the Commander of MND-N, U. S. Major General William Nash, are that the Russian contingent is performing well and evenhandedly and doing all that is expected of it. Such unprecedented NATO-Russian cooperation represents a significant highlight of the IFOR deployment.

Overall, IFOR has some 52,746 troops in Bosnia and a total of 54,402 troops in Bosnia and its surrounding countries. These forces come from 15 NATO nations and 17 non-NATO nations. Other nations besides the United States, in particular France and the United Kingdom, have contributed substantial combat forces to this operation and are at work patrolling sectors and undertaking functions similar to those of U.S. troops.

Compliance with the Dayton Agreement at D+120

As NATO Secretary General Solana noted in his press conference yesterday, "Our judgement is that there continues to be reasonable adherence by the Parties to the military annex of the Peace Agreement. There are no hostilities or preparations for the

usual spring offensives. Forces are separated and the Parties are generally compliant with the Zone of Separation.” Of particular note: there have been no major confrontations between the Parties since the Agreement entered into force December 14. In fact, the cease-fire between the Formerly Warring Factions has remained in place since October 12. This, in itself, is a significant accomplishment of both the Dayton Agreement and IFOR’s deployment.

It is also worth noting that spring is now arriving in Bosnia - a time which for the past several years has meant the resumption of large-scale fighting in that country. However, this year is different. This spring is being marked by the Formerly Warring Factions steadily moving heavy weapons and troops into designated cantonment areas and barracks. IFOR has been able to break the normal cycle of violence, and we believe such a development bodes well for the future of the country.

The D+120 mark also represents a major milestone with regard to the overall security environment in Bosnia. At previous milestones mandated in the Dayton Agreement, the military forces of the Formerly Warring Factions withdrew behind the Zone of Separation along the Agreed Cease-Fire Line (D+30); vacated and cleared the areas of transfer and withdrew behind the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its accompanying Zone of Separation (D+45), and began moving their air defense weapon to storage sites (D+90).

At D+120, the Parties pledged to move their forces and heavy weapons to cantonments and barracks, and then demobilize those units that could not be accommodated within those facilities. In the view of Commander - IFOR (COMIFOR), Admiral Leighton Smith and Supreme Allied Commander - Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan, the Parties are moving steadily to satisfy D+120 requirements, although they were unable to comply fully with the April 18 deadline. The problems the Parties are encountering in complying fully with the D+120 requirement stem largely from poor communications and organization, as well as a lack of adequate cantonment areas for the large amounts of equipment being consolidated. The selection of appropriate cantonments for the storage of heavy weapons, equipment, and forces has turned out to be an enormous and complex task for all concerned. There are a few interim military barracks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has necessitated the establishment of cantonment areas, each of which must be assessed by IFOR for suitability. Despite these problems, we expect the Parties to comply fully with their D+120 responsibilities.

We also continue to press the Parties at the highest levels on other deadlines or requirements that have only been partially met. We are working to ensure that full compliance with Dayton is achieved on all outstanding issues.

Challenges to IFOR

While there is little prospect of any direct, organized conventional military attack against IFOR, IFOR commanders remain vigilant in monitoring the overall security

situation and seeking to reduce even the potential for confrontation. In addition, the potential threat from disgruntled elements or individuals remains and is fully taken into account in IFOR's force protection plans.

The key threat to IFOR troops remains mines and other unexploded ordnance. IFOR's latest estimates are that there are some 6 million mines in Bosnia and mine removal remains an enormous remaining task. COMIFOR estimates that about 50 percent of known minefields have been cleared, but the exact location of many additional minefields is unknown. IFOR continues to work closely with the Office of the High Representative and non-governmental organizations to make progress on mine clearance.

Despite the fact that all of the key deadlines in the Military Annex have now come and gone, IFOR will continue to face implementation challenges. Ensuring completion of the cantonment process, providing for freedom of movement to allow for the return of refugees and displaced persons, and supporting the War Crimes Tribunal are several of the key challenges which lie ahead.

IFOR Contributions to Civilian Implementation

As the critical deadlines of the military annex of the Dayton Agreement have been met, IFOR is now better able to undertake some of the supporting tasks included in its mandate and mission statement. These include:

- Providing assistance to international civilian organizations (e.g., UNCHR and the ICTY) in the execution of their missions.
- Ensuring freedom of movement for civilian populations and refugees.
- And monitoring the marking and clearing of minefields throughout Bosnia.

But while assistance to civilian implementation will continue to be provided by IFOR on a case-by-case basis, it will be done in a manner that does not detract from its primary military mission, and IFOR must continue to focus on providing a stable and secure environment in Bosnia which allows civilian implementation to go forward.

Nevertheless, successful military and civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement are closely linked and their implementation efforts must complement each other. IFOR is committed to maintaining a close and effective relationship with the High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, who is responsible for coordinating various aspects of civilian implementation of the Agreement. IFOR's Civilian Military Cooperation, or CIMIC, representatives work closely with Mr. Bildt's staff.

In the course of carrying out its military mission, IFOR has also undertaken certain limited repair or reconstruction projects that benefit its own protection and

freedom of movement but also have the collateral effect of aiding the larger Bosnia civilian reconstruction effort. Examples include:

- Undertaking critical bridge construction and road repair.
- Providing expert advice on public infrastructure rebuilding, such as power, water, and telecommunications.
- Providing liaison and expertise to the IPTF.
- Security and maintenance of critical electrical facilities in Sarajevo.

IFOR will continue to **assist other** agencies with **their** responsibilities when doing so does not adversely impact its primary military mission.

IFOR Assistance to the ICTY

IFOR is also continuing to assist the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as it undertakes its vitally important work. In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) worked out in January 1996 between the IFOR Commander, Admiral Smith, and the Chief Prosecutor for the Tribunal, Justice Richard Goldstone, IFOR supports the work of the Tribunal in several ways:

- Exchanging information on Tribunal indictments, arrest warrants, and the identification of indicted war criminals.
- Transferring indicted war criminals to Tribunal custody if IFOR troops, in the normal course of their duties, come into contact with them.
- Providing area security, communications, and logistics support to Tribunal investigators in a manner that does not detract from IFOR's military mission.

While the principal responsibility for seeing that war criminals are brought to justice rests with the Parties to the Dayton Agreement, DoD and NATO policy remains that the work of the International Tribunal will be strongly supported. The United States has already made substantial contributions, in terms of fiscal and personnel resources, to advance the Tribunal's work.

One of IFOR's largest contributions to the work of the Tribunal involves providing a secure environment, through the normal execution of its mission, to ICTY investigators as they carry out their mission in Bosnia. IFOR also conducts an ongoing surveillance program - from the air and the ground - which supports the efforts of the Tribunal. Of note, IFOR has provided several hundred troops, backed by artillery,

helicopters, communications, and other logistics support, to provide area security (and some close-in security) for Tribunal field investigators at mass grave sites. Recently, U.S. IFOR personnel provided this type of assistance to Tribunal personnel conducting investigations in the Srebrenica area in early April. Such assistance was consistent with IFOR's principal mission and in line with modalities worked out between IFOR and the Tribunal. Both the Secretary of Defense and Justice Goldstone remain satisfied with the constructive and cooperative relationship that has been established between IFOR and the International War Crimes Tribunal.

Completion of the IFOR Mission and IFOR Withdrawal

There has been some speculation in the press of late concerning a possible extension of IFOR's mission in Bosnia beyond one year. In accordance with previously stated policy, let me restate that the Department of Defense has no plans to extend IFOR's mission beyond one year. UN Security Council Resolution 1031 provides the mandate for a one year IFOR mission, and NATO's North Atlantic Council has authorized IFOR to carry out its mission for that same period. We continue to believe that a one year IFOR deployment provides sufficient time for the Formerly Warring Factions to choose peace and begin in earnest the processes of national reconstruction, new institution building and reconciliation.

Our plan is for American IFOR forces to be withdrawn from Bosnia upon mission completion, approximately one year after the beginning of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. We say "approximately" to acknowledge that all U.S. troops may not be withdrawn from Bosnia precisely one year after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, given logistical, safety, and scheduling issues that come into play.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer questions from you and other members of the committee.



THOMAS K. LONGSTRETH

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (STRATEGY AND REQUIREMENTS)

Thomas K. Longstreth was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in March 1994. Since October 1995, he has also served as Director of the Secretary of Defense's Bosnia Task Force, advising the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) on matters related to U.S. military involvement in Bosnia. From September 1993 to April 1994, Mr. Longstreth also served as Director of the Department of Defense Somalia Task Force. In January 1996, Mr. Longstreth received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service in recognition of his contributions to the Bosnia, Somalia and Iraq task forces.



Immediately prior to taking on his current position, Mr. Longstreth served as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. From 1990- 1993, Thomas Longstreth served as a Strategic Planner on the Joint Staff, where he was a major participant in the strategic and operational planning for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (Iraq), Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), and other U.S. military operations. He also participated in the preparation of many central strategic planning documents, including the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance. Mr. Longstreth also directly supported the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a speech writer, drafter of Congressional testimony, and principal drafter of such documents as the Chairman's Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces.

From 1987-1990, Mr. Longstreth served as the Associate Director for Strategic Weapons Policy, Federation of American Scientists, where he specialized in U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons programs and related arms control issues. From 1985-1987, he was the Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, serving as the principal advisor to Senator Kennedy on all defense and arms control issues. From 1982-1985, he was the Associate Director for Research and Analysis, Arms Control Association.

Mr. Longstreth was born May 16, 1956 in Akron, Ohio. In 1979, he graduated from Wesleyan University with the Bachelor of Arts degree in American History. In 1984, Mr. Longstreth completed the Master of Arts degree program at George Washington University's School of Public and International Affairs. Mr. Longstreth resides in Arlington, Virginia.

Statement of the Honorable Christopher H. Smith
on
U.S. Policy Towards Bosnia
April 23, 1996

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to participate in today's timely hearing on U.S. policy towards Bosnia, particularly in light of recent disclosures charging that the Clinton administration tacitly allowed Iran to ship arms to Bosnia via Croatia. As the House sponsor of a bipartisan effort to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, I am extremely concerned over the implications and consequences of such a policy should these allegations indeed be substantiated. It is ironic that President Clinton apparently was willing to turn a blind eye towards Iran while blocking a majority in the Congress -- a bipartisan majority -- that called for the United States -- not Iran -- to take the lead in upholding Bosnia's legitimate and fundamental right to defend itself.

Should the Bosnians have been given the means to defend themselves in the face of aggression and genocide? Absolutely. Should those arms have come from Iran? Absolutely not.

In the past few years, Members from both sides of the aisle put aside their differences to respond to the senseless slaughter of innocent civilians by well-armed Serb militants in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Repeatedly we raised our voices calling upon the President to display determined U.S. leadership in the face of aggression and genocide. These calls were repeatedly rebuffed. When we voted in overwhelming support to lift the arms embargo, we were told by the White House that such an action was not in the interest of the United States as it would lead to an "Americanization" of the conflict, result in the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops, and undermine the United Nations Security Council.

Mr. Chairman, when all is said and done, the fundamental issue at stake here, as in so many other instances, is one of leadership.

For nearly three years the Clinton administration, like the one before it, largely passed the buck on Bosnia. The Europeans, for their part, raised the specter of Islamic fundamentalism as an excuse for inaction. Mr. Chairman, it is inexplicable how turning a blind eye towards Iran -- a terrorist state -- was in the interest of the United States.

Regrettably, the international community and the United States refused to undertake meaningful action themselves to end the genocide or to provide the Bosnians with the means to defend themselves. By default at best, and with our acquiescence at worst, Teheran was allowed to fill in the gap resulting from the failure of the Clinton administration to act and to lead -- a crisis of leadership. By turning a blind eye in this instance, President Clinton has unwittingly strengthened a small nationalist minority in Bosnia at the expense of those truly committed to the preservation of a multi-ethnic state; damaged our position in the United Nations; and potentially exposed the 20,000 American troops he ordered to Bosnia to even greater danger.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and hope that they will be able to shed some light on these disturbing developments. Thank you.

Question for the Record submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

1. What do you see as the actual role of the International Police Task Force in light of the events on the ground in Bosnia over the past several months? In light of the uneven cooperation from the police and public security forces in Bosnia, particularly on the part of the Croatian forces, and in light of the evident inability of the IPTF to control the looting and burning of the Sarajevo suburbs, what exactly is their mission? Can they be expected to play any role without the full and unequivocal backing of the IFOR troops?

A. The International Police Task Force's mission is primarily one of advising and monitoring the local police as they perform their functions, as well as assisting the parties in the critical task of restructuring the police forces in The Federation and Republika Srpska. Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords, as implemented in UN Security Council Resolution 1035, outlines the mission the IPTF is to perform in Bosnia.

The IPTF is not armed and, under its current mandate, not authorized to perform an executive policing function in Bosnia; this clearly is the responsibility of the parties (The Federation and Republika Srpska). When local police fail to act, the police monitors file a report so stating. We expect such reports to be weighed in the process of selecting the new police. In life-threatening or potentially life-threatening situations, the IPTF may call in the Implementation Force (IFOR) for back-up. Cooperation between the IPTF and IFOR is positive.

The IPTF has created a Commission on Police Restructuring to develop standards and procedures for police restructuring issues ranging from vetting to training to

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demobilization. We expect the international police monitors to participate in all aspects of the restructuring, including the selection of police for inclusion in the new Federation Cantonal police, which is set to begin in late May/early June. Once the process of bringing in the new police is underway, the IPTF will play a more significant role in providing on-the-job training.

Question for the Record submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

2. Can they (IPTF) be expected to play a role of monitoring police functions in Bosnia? Does this force have the stature and credibility to play such a role? Is there any reasonable expectation that the IPTF will be able to play an even handed role in vetting prospective police candidates and otherwise ensuring that only those with a legitimate police background will be tasked with maintaining public order throughout Bosnia?

A. Monitoring police functions in Bosnia is a primary element of the IPTF's mandate. The police monitors are performing this role now in Bosnia. With numbers approaching planned, full-strength levels, the monitors are frequently gaining access to local police stations, conducting patrols, monitoring investigations, following up on accusations of human rights violations, and facilitating the resolution of local disputes. Their capacity to monitor will improve as the local police are downsized and the ratio of police monitors to police improves.

We are also developing a program, in cooperation with IPTF, to standardize materials for IPTF personnel in the field to be used as guidelines for advising local police. We hope this training will lead to more consistent performance by the police monitors.

The IPTF has established a Commission on Police Restructuring, approved by the Federation's leadership in late April, to develop plans and standards for restructuring the new Cantonal police within the Federation. The Commission, whose members include the Deputy IPTF Commissioner, the Federation Interior Minister and

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representatives from IPTF, IFOR, and the three local police forces, will provide recommendations to IPTF Commissioner Fitzgerald on critical restructuring issues, including selection of the new police. Commissioner Fitzgerald is expected to announce his plans for restructuring in late May.

We expect the police monitors to play an important role in all aspects of the restructuring process, but particularly in selecting police for inclusion in the new Cantonal police and we are confident in their ability to perform this function effectively. Their experience working with the local police on the ground may provide a resource for ascertaining the abilities and potential of the local police to serve in the new Cantonal police forces.

Question for the Record submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

3. Does the composition of the 1,222 man force coming from many Asian and Moslem countries in any way compromise the possible utility of the force and its deployment in all parts of Bosnia? Has the UN failed to recruit enough officers from European countries? Are all the candidates thus far selected able to comply with all the job qualifications, including command of English and driving proficiency?

A. Due to the similarities between policing and judicial systems in Bosnia and other parts of Europe, we strongly encouraged the UN to solicit large contributions of police monitors from European countries as a way to maximize the operational potential of the IPTF. We also pressed bilaterally governments with particularly well-respected police forces for significant participation. Some of these countries responded to our requests; others did not.

Ultimately, some 34 countries are contributing toward the IPTF's authorized level of 1,721 police monitors, which we will meet very soon. The IPTF is deployed in multinational contingents throughout Bosnia.

The IPTF contingents undergo a UN screening and orientation program in Zagreb before deployment. The 4-5 day program is intended to confirm that candidates meet the job qualifications and prepare police monitors to fulfill their mission on the ground. Those who do not meet the minimum qualifications are returned home at the expense of their government.

Unfortunately, the screening/orientation has proved insufficient in preparing some of the IPTF personnel for the

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rigors of their assignments in the field. We are working with the IPTF to develop a supplemental training program to improve the effectiveness of the police monitors and to standardize materials and procedures for on-the-job training of local police.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

4. Question:

How soon after April 1994, when the U.S. indicated its non-objection to the Iranian arms shipments, did the Administration begin its policy review on Iran?

Answer:

The Administration convened a mid-term review of Iran policy in December of 1994. Discussions continued through April 1995 and led to the President's decision to issue the May 6, 1995, Executive Order imposing a trade and investment embargo on Iran.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

5. Question:

To what extent did the Iranian shipments to Bosnia figure into the policy review?

Answer:

The policy review focused primarily on ways to increase the pressure on Iran in order to induce it to change its objectionable behavior. According to available documentation, it did not address the issue of Iranian shipments to Bosnia.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

6. Question:

How does the U.S. policy on the Iranian arms shipments fit with the decision in April of 1995 to ban U.S. trade with Iran?

Answer:

The April 1995 decision to ban U.S. trade with Iran was designed to demonstrate U.S. leadership and increase the economic pressure on Iran to change its unacceptable behavior. That decision was not affected by the 1994 decision regarding shipments of arms through Croatia.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 1

Secretary Tarnoff, when the Administration consulted with the Congress last year on the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia, we were told unequivocally that the deployment would end by the end of the year. I would like to ask you if that commitment to bring our troops out of Bosnia and return them to their bases either in Germany or back in the U.S. by the end of December now stands? Have there been any discussion within the Administration on extending IFOR's deployment, either with or without U.S. troops? Have there been any such discussions with our allies in Europe?

Answer

From the beginning of his Administration the President made clear that he was prepared to support the deployment of U.S. forces in conjunction with a peace agreement in Bosnia. Following the successful negotiation of the Dayton accords, the President indicated his intention to deploy approximately 20,000 U.S. ground troops as part of the NATO-led IFOR. The Dayton Accords, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031 authorizing IFOR, and the NATO Operational Plan governing IFOR's deployment set forth a duration of "approximately one year" or "about 12 months". As the President stated in his November 27, 1995, address to the nation, "Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission should and will take about one year." The President subsequently wrote to House Speaker Gingrich on December 21, saying, "... and I expect, that the military mission can be accomplished in about a year." This has been - and remains - Administration policy.

On April 30, the President approved an approach regarding the drawdown of troops in Bosnia consistent with previous Administration and NATO policy. Specifically, it recognized that IFOR will play a crucial role in providing security for upcoming Bosnian elections, which, according to the Dayton Agreement, are to be held by mid-September. To that end, IFOR should remain at full strength through the Bosnian elections. The pace and extent of the drawdown in the period between the Bosnian elections and the conclusion of IFOR's mandate on December 20 will be determined by General Joulwan and other senior NATO military officials, in consultation with NATO's North Atlantic Council.

IFOR should retain until December 20, 1996 sufficient forces to accomplish its full mission and protect the lives of its personnel including U.S. troops. This approach will mean that IFOR would complete its drawdown in the weeks after December 20, on a schedule and in a manner consistent with logistical requirements and the safety of our troops.

The Administration remains committed to completing IFOR's mission in approximately one year. Neither the U.S nor NATO is planning to extend IFOR's mission.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 2

I understand that IFOR will postpone the withdrawal of some items that originally were slated for withdrawal in September in order to avoid negatively affecting the campaign and elections scheduled for mid-September. How have delays in the elections affected IFOR's timetable for withdrawal? Is it possible that the elections may have to be postponed beyond the September 14 deadline specified in the Dayton plan?

Answer

On April 30, the President approved an approach regarding the drawdown of troops in Bosnia consistent with previous Administration and NATO policy. Specifically, it recognized that IFOR will play a crucial role in providing security for upcoming Bosnian elections, which, according to the Dayton Agreement, are to be held by mid-September. To that end, IFOR should remain at full strength through the Bosnian elections. The pace and extent of the drawdown in the period between the Bosnian elections and the conclusion of IFOR's mandate on December 20 will be determined by General Joulwan and other senior NATO military officials, in consultation with NATO's North Atlantic Council.

The former warring parties in Bosnia are responsible for carrying out elections on the timetable they agreed in Dayton. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

will supervise and monitor the elections. Neither the OSCE nor the Bosnian parties have indicated that they expect to delay elections.

NATO has no plans to extend the IFOR mission beyond December 1996. The end of IFOR's mission is not linked in any way to Bosnian elections.

Question for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 24, 1996

Q 3: Do you now believe that the security environment at the end of this year will be sufficient to allow the rebuilding of civilian society in Bosnia to proceed even without the presence of IFOR?

A: IFOR is well on its way to successfully accomplishing the mandate set out for it by the Dayton Accords. IFOR has been very effective at separating the former warring forces, establishing zones of separation, and assuring freedom of movement. Good progress is being made on establishing cantonment areas and assuring that the parties have moved heavy weapons into those declared sites, where they can be monitored by the OSCE. Institution building, reconstruction, and elections in Bosnia are the next challenges to be met. There is no reason to believe that these tasks cannot be accomplished by the parties, supported by a variety of international efforts. IFOR expects to have completed its tasks and overall mission within the designated one year timeframe. Civilian implementation tasks will proceed parallel to IFOR efforts for the balance of the year and carry on subsequent to IFOR's departure.

The International Police Task Force is undertaking a restructuring of existing local police structures and police monitors are providing on-the-job training to local police so that a secure and stable environment, in which human rights are respected, can be maintained after IFOR and the

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IPTF depart. Military holdings will be stabilized and proportionate, also as outlined in the Dayton agreements, and the OSCE will be monitoring compliance. The international community has reserved the right to impose further sanctions, if necessary. But as we have consistently stated, it is ultimately up to the parties themselves to build and maintain a durable peace.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 4

Have we discussed with our allies in Europe how to assure that the post-IFOR security environment is satisfactory? Have we made any commitments to participate in any fashion in an international operation for Bosnia involving military forces after the end of the year?

Answer

Neither this Administration nor NATO is planning at this time to deploy a follow-on force in Bosnia. The U.S. has made no commitments to participate in a NATO force or any other international effort to provide security in Bosnia after IFOR departs.

The U.S. and NATO have decided to focus their efforts, along with those agencies responsible for civilian implementation, on the important tasks that must be accomplished in Bosnia over the next several months. Our goal is to build over the next eight months - a cumulative record of achievements for peace that will outlast IFOR's departure, including elections, arms control, reconstruction, and return of refugees.

It is premature to consider what the Bosnian security situation might be in 1997 after IFOR departs.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 5:

Will the delays in getting the program to equip and train the Federation's military forces underway affect IFOR's withdrawal? Are we going to leave Bosnia if the Federation is not equipped and trained to defend its territory?

Answer

Commencement of the U.S.-led train and equip program is conditioned on the removal of foreign forces from Bosnia and the establishment of Federation defense institutions which are needed to manage the program.

The U.S. expects the Bosnians to meet these conditions in the near future.

An important step forward was taken on May 14 in Washington at the Federation Forum meeting when Federation President Zubak and Vice President Ganic reached final agreement on the immediate establishment of a single Federation Ministry of Defense, a single military command structure, through the Joint Staff level, and integrated specialized units, such as training, logistics and air defense units. Agreement was also reached on the integration of all Federation military forces under a three year time limit.

Once all conditions are met, the train and equip program can begin in a matter of days.

There is sufficient time for this program to improve the military forces of the Federation significantly by year's end. Large amounts of equipment can be delivered and distributed, including the approximately \$100 million in excess U.S. defense stocks which is authorized by Congress for transfer this year. Major improvements in training can also still be made in the time which remains before IFOR's withdrawal.

Federation security is dependent on many variables. Ultimately, the Federation's security requirements will depend on the attitudes of the Bosnian Serbs and their cooperation with arms control and peace implementation. If the Bosnian Serbs comply with Dayton, the training and equipment we can provide over the next six months would be more than adequate to ensure short-term stabilization. If the Bosnian Serbs resume hostilities, however, a more intensive, more quickly paced program may be required.

Question for the Record submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

6. Secretary Tarnoff, can you explain what the mandate of the International Police Task Force is and how it fits into the Dayton Framework?

A. Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords, as implemented in UN Security Council Resolution 1035, defines the International Police Task Force's mandate in Bosnia as that of assisting local authorities in providing a safe and secure environment for all persons in the region. In fulfilling its mandate, the IPTF is expected to monitor and advise local law enforcement and assist in their training; advise government authorities on the organization of effective law enforcement structures; and facilitate law enforcement activities by accompanying local police as they carry out their functions.

To date, IPTF's role has been primarily one of advising and monitoring local police activities. IPTF monitors have access to local police stations, conduct patrols, monitor investigations, follow up on accusations of human rights violations, and facilitate the resolution of local disputes.

The IPTF established a Commission on Police Restructuring, approved by the Federation's leadership in late April, to develop plans and standards for restructuring the new Cantonal police within the Federation. We expect the police monitors to play an important role in all aspects of restructuring the local police forces, particularly in the selection of officers for inclusion in the new Cantonal police. Their experience working with local police on the ground provides a resource that could be used to ascertain the abilities and potential of the local police to serve in the Cantonal police forces.

Question for the Record submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

7. Will the IPTF vet those claiming to be police in Bosnia to weed out para-military or militia members from persons who have performed legitimate police functions in Bosnia in the past?

How is the process of vetting the police going in the Republic of Srbska?

A. The parties to the Dayton Accords recognized that an impartial, non-political police force would be critical to peace in Bosnia. In an effort to arrive at such a force, the IPTF has established a Commission on Police Restructuring in the Federation under the leadership of Deputy IPTF Commissioner Robert Wasserman whose membership includes senior Federation officials, senior representatives from the three police forces, and an IFOR representative. At the Petersberg meetings on April 25, Federation officials signed an agreement committing the Federation to participate in the Commission and to abide by the instructions on police restructuring that the IPTF Commissioner is expected to announce, based upon the Commission's guidance, in late May. Critical elements of the restructuring, which the IPTF and the Commission are cooperatively addressing, are police functions, qualifications of personnel to perform such functions, and procedures and standards for selecting those qualified to participate in the restructured police force.

The IPTF has established a similar Commission for Police Restructuring in the Republika Srpska but the Serbs have provided insufficient cooperation to date. We are concerned about the lack of cooperation and are considering ways to encourage greater Serb cooperation.

Question for the Record submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

8. How long will the IPTF remain in Bosnia? What is the total cost to the U.S. per year? How many Americans are participating? How many from our allies in Europe?

A. The IPTF's current mandate expires in December. It is premature to say whether the UN Security Council will extend the mandate, although we are beginning informal consultations with our allies on this issue.

The U.S. is contributing police monitors and training to implement Annex 11's clause on cooperating on police issues in Bosnia. We are funding the recruitment, selection, equipping, salaries, and some logistical support for 200 American monitors (at least 150 for Bosnia and up to 50 for Eastern Slavonia). In addition to supporting 200 U.S. police monitors, we will also provide training for the restructured police force in cooperation with the IPTF leadership and other international donors.

We strongly encouraged the Europeans to make significant contributions to the UN Civilian Police training in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia. Thus far, the European countries have contributed approximately one-third of the anticipated total of 1,721 police monitors.

Question for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 24, 1996

Q 9: How many persons has IFOR received reports of being detained simply on account of their ethnic affiliation?

A: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the organization that tries to account for persons detained in Bosnia, and that has the most reliable current statistics. ICRC has secured the release of almost all detainees. It is very hard for the ICRC to get an exact current count of the number of persons still detained by the former warring factions, on the grounds that they may be war criminals, but we believe it to be much reduced and relatively small. The ICRC is coordinating with the International Tribunal in The Hague in an effort to establish whether the Tribunal considers that any of the remaining detainees should be charged as war criminals. In the event that the Tribunal does not have any interest in prosecuting, the ICRC hopes then to be able to secure the release of all remaining detainees.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 10:

To what degree do Bosnian citizens enjoy freedom of movement throughout Bosnian territory? Is freedom of movement a condition stipulated in Dayton?

Answer

According to the Dayton Accords, Bosnian citizens are granted full freedom of movement throughout the region. It is a central tenet of the peace agreement and significant to lasting stability in the region.

There has been violence in some cases when refugees tried to exercise their right of freedom of movement. However, there have also been cases of success where refugees have safely visited their homes.

The ultimate success of Dayton and Bosnian citizens' ability to exercise their freedom of movement rests with the Parties. The U.S. is continuing to work with these Parties and the international community to ensure the full implementation of the Dayton Accords and the recognition of the rights adopted by the signatories to Dayton.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 11:

Can you update us on the status of war crimes investigations? How many of those that have been indicted by the International Tribunal have been turned over to the custody of the Tribunal?

Answer

To date, the UN War Crimes Tribunal has indicted 58 suspects -- forty-six Serbs, nine Croats, and three Moslems -- and holds six of them at its jail in the Hague. So far one case (Tadic) has come to trial.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Dayton Accords, the Parties are obligated to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Such cooperation would include honoring requests of the International Tribunal for the arrest and surrender of indicted war criminals.

IFOR has agreed to arrest indicted war criminals if its forces should encounter such individuals and to transfer them to the custody of the ICTY.

Question for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 24, 1996

Q 12: Stories appeared in the papers yesterday of IFOR troops shooting over the heads of crowds of Muslim refugees seeking to exercise the right of return to the former homes which is stipulated in the Dayton agreements. Apparently several groups of these displaced Muslims were intercepted by gangs of Serbs who prevented them from going back to visit their home villages, and IFOR intervened to prevent a clash between the groups. Do these incidents, in the Administrations's view, presage renewed conflict between the ethnic groups? Cannot Muslim or other refugees legitimately claim that they are entitled to return to their homes, and that if local law enforcement cannot protect them, then IFOR must?

A: The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is the organization that is coordinating return movements of refugees within Bosnia. UNHCR is committed to assuring freedom of movement, and as part of its effort to better facilitate freedom of movement while minimizing risks of violence, it now supports a program of assessment visits of refugee and displaced person representatives to their communities of origin. The hope is to avoid uncoordinated large group movements, which carry a much higher risk of violence.

In response to two incidents of violence at the end of April, the UNHCR Special Envoy in Sarajevo coordinated new guidelines for visits of displaced persons to their home areas. In accordance with the guidelines, UNHCR field offices will take on the responsibility for first coordinating all requests for visits of refugees and displaced persons with local authorities, and will notify IFOR and the International Police Task Force.

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Local civilian authorities are obliged to cooperate in these arrangements and permit the visits of small representative groups. They are also obliged to ensure the security of visiting delegations. In the event of any difficulties with local authorities, UNHCR under the guidelines will notify central authorities and request intervention. UNHCR will also discuss with IPTF and IFOR their support for proposed visits. Local police authorities have the full responsibility for maintaining law and order, and the IPTF will assist local police, at their request. IFOR will be available to provide support for IPTF if requested.

Question for the Record
Submitted to
Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

Question 16:

What were the countries of origin of war material supplied to Croatia and Bosnia in contravention of the embargo other than Iran?

Answer:

We have provided classified documents which address this question to the Senate Intelligence Committee and we will provide these same materials to the House International Relations Committee and other appropriate Congressional committees that request them.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 17:

Was the Iranian material crucial to the survival of Bosnia? Of Croatia?

Answer:

In the spring of 1994, the nascent Bosnian Federation was in danger of collapse, Sarajevo was surrounded, and water, electricity and humanitarian supplies were threatened. Without help from an outside source, we believe that Bosnia might not have survived Serb aggression.

Croatia was in a stronger position militarily and economically, and the advantages it accrued as a result of its role in the transfers were not crucial to its survival. Such help was certainly an important factor in Croatia's recovery of Serb-occupied territories in 1995.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 18:

Did you or anyone in the Department of State or elsewhere in the Administration at or above your level believe at the time that it was crucial to Bosnia's survival or Croatia's survival?

Answer:

I believed it was the general understanding among members of the Administration that Bosnia might not survive without outside assistance. We did not believe in the spring of 1994 that Croatia's survival was directly or immediately threatened.

Question for the Record
Submitted to
Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

Question 19:

What would have happened if we had not given a "no instruction" response to the Croats? What would have happened if we had actively opposed the Iranian connection?

Answer:

If we had objected to Iranian arms shipments and if the Croats had complied, the Muslim-Croat Federation might have been destroyed in its infancy, making a bad situation for the Bosnians even worse.

At the time, we were abiding by our obligation under UN Security Council Resolution 713 not to provide arms to Bosnia, thus avoiding the harmful consequences that would have resulted from unilateral lift. But we chose not to take a position with respect to Croatia's permitting arms shipments to Bosnia across its territory.

Before the 1994 decision, and despite the UN arms embargo, Iran had established itself as Bosnia's principal arms supplier. We have no evidence that the size of the Iranian presence in Bosnia increased significantly after April 1994. Our policy of a "no instructions" response to arms shipments by third parties, however, helped to set the stage for changes in the military balance in Bosnia, which in turn led to the successful negotiation of the Dayton Accords; implementation of the Accords and of the provisions on foreign forces has led to reduced Iranian influence in the region.

Question for the Record
Submitted to
Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

Question 20:

Would the Bosnians and Croatsians have found other sources of supply? Why would these not have been adequate?

Answer:

Bosnia and Croatia were seeking arms under adverse conditions, including the restrictions imposed by the arms embargo. Iran was not the only potential supplier, but the number of countries willing and able to supply arms was limited. Faced with an immediate threat to its very survival, Bosnia in particular looked for arms wherever it could find them. Even with the supply of some arms from Iran, the Bosnians were heavily outgunned by the Serbs.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 21:

How much did it cost the U.S. to maintain the fiction of an embargo while looking the other way when Iran (and other countries) violated it?

Answer:

We believe that in deciding not to endorse or object, we chose the best policy for both the United States and Bosnia. Under the circumstances, we chose to uphold our obligation under UN Security Council Resolution 713 not to provide arms to Bosnia, thus avoiding the harmful consequences that would have resulted from unilateral lift. But we chose not to take a position with respect to Croatia's permitting arms shipments to Bosnia across its territory. We believe that the Administration made the correct decision at the time, and that subsequent events have borne that out.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 22

When will the U.S. deliver the first tranche of military equipment we have pledged to assist the Federation's military forces?

Answer

The President has authorized the Department of State to notify Congress of his intention to use Section 540(b) of P.L. 104-107 to transfer defense articles to the Federation's armed forces, but noted that this transfer would be contingent upon Bosnian compliance with the Dayton Agreement provision for removal of foreign forces.

The Defense Security Assistance Agency estimates that the lead-time for the delivery of the first tranche of military equipment is 45 days.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 23

Has the Federation signed a contract with a consultant who will coordinate the equipping and training program?

Answer

Not yet. Federation representatives have negotiated a contract and it will shortly be ready for signature. On May 7, 1996 Congress was notified of the Administration's intention to approve technical assistance agreements that will permit work to be performed under this contract. These agreements will be signed by the Department of State and prospective contractors in the near future.

Question for the Record
Submitted to Under Secretary Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Bosnia
April 24, 1996

Question 24

Can you describe to what degree the Bosnian-Croat and Bosnian forces have been integrated? What does this indicate about the cohesiveness of the Bosnian-Croat Federation?

Answer

HVO and ABiH forces generally coordinated their operations during the last months of the war in Bosnia. They did so with an undeveloped, integrated Joint Staff organization.

Since Dayton, the Bosniaks and Croats have committed themselves to the full integration of Federation military forces as a goal of the Federation. At the May 14 meeting of the Federation Forum in Washington, the Bosniak and Croat leaders of the Federation formally agreed on the immediate establishment of a single Federation Ministry of Defense, a single military command structure through the Joint Staff level, and integrated specialized units, such as training, logistics and air defense units. All Federation military forces are to be integrated within three years. These agreements are codified in the Defense Law of the Federation which will be submitted by May 29 to the Federation Assembly for final passage.

The progress toward integration of Federation armed forces indicates that, while mutual suspicions linger, the Bosniak and Croat communities remain committed to the Dayton principle that "a strong and fully functioning Federation" is essential for "a lasting peaceful settlement."



Question for the Record
Submitted to
Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff
House International Relations Committee
April 23, 1996

Question 25:

How many diplomatic personnel does the U.S. have accredited to the Bosnian government? How many diplomatic personnel does Iran have in Bosnia?

Answer:

The U.S. has twenty-nine established diplomatic positions at the Embassy in Sarajevo, but not all are accredited to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Currently, seventeen of these positions are filled and the remaining are due to be encumbered in the near future.

In addition, we have eight AID, one USIA, and two DIA personnel in Sarajevo.

The U.S. has seven Americans assigned to the Office of the High Representative. The Embassy is not sending accreditation notification to the GOB-H for the High Rep Americans.

The Iranian Embassy has seventeen personnel officially accredited to the Government of Bosnia.

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